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Summary 
This thesis aims to contribute to the discourse of masculinity in the context of work, family 
life and individual life purpose of men, through the case of young Japanese salarymen. It 
postulates that the hegemonic masculinity ideal in Japan is currently undergoing a 
transformation and attempts to uncover in which direction this transformation is headed. 
There is still a gender gap in various instances of patriarchal cultures, and though an abundant 
catalogue of feminist literature has continued to investigate the reasons for and developments 
of these gender gaps, I agree with masculinity researcher Harry Brod in that ―the key to the 
gender gap lies in the study of men, not women.‖ (Brod, 1987). 
Examining the specific cases of twelve salarymen, this thesis illuminates their views with 
hegemonic masculinity, gender discrepancy, gender constructionist and gender boundary 
theories. It builds upon already existing empirical research of Tomoko Hidaka (2010), 
Masako Ishii-Kuntz (1993, 2003), Romit Dasgupta (2000, 2003), Gordon Mathews (2003) 
and to some degree, Anne Allison (1994). 
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1 Introduction 
On February 19
th
 2011, a feature in Japan Today stated that, ―as the public perceptions of 
traditional gender roles shift, more and more Japanese men have become willing to take on 
homemaking. Some opinion polls show majorities of men in their 20s and 30s have no 
negative notions of men serving as the househusbands of their families.‖1 It concludes that 
while this change in public attitude is a positive development, it is still hard to make ends 
meet on a single income. This article is one of the many examples illustrating that this is a 
time of change, where public opinion and gender ideologies are undergoing a vivid 
transformation towards a more gender-equal society. But the question remains: in what 
direction are these changes actually headed? 
 
The main reason why I chose to research the example of Japanese salarymen in particular is 
that I would like to contribute to the discourse on masculinity with regards to the relation 
between family and work in Japan. There has been a wealth of diverse and extensive research 
on feminism, and the rights, possibilities and limitations of women in Japanese work life
2
, but 
little research conducted on men‘s situations in comparison. To be more specific, extensive 
comparative research has already been carried out in a corporate context on workers in 
Japanese and American companies, with a focus on business and the financial aspects of 
labour, as well as organisation of labour unions. Comparatively little study has been carried 
out on social norms and masculinity in Japan.
3
 Up to this point, only a few researchers have 
specifically focused on salarymen in Japan employing gender and masculinity theory, most 
prominently: Anne Allison, Romit Dasgupta, Masako Ishii-Kuntz, James E. Roberson and 
Nobue Suzuki, and most recently, Tomoko Hidaka. My thesis aims to draw upon this 
catalogue of works, with the hope that the results of my research will become a part of the 
                                                 
1
 "More Japanese Men Relish Joy of Homemaking," Japan Today, 
http://www.japantoday.com/category/lifestyle/view/more-japanese-men-relish-joy-of-homemaking. 
2
 See for instance Murase (2006), Ogasawara (1998), Liddle and Nakajima (2000), Brinton (2001) and Lowy 
(2007) used in this thesis, as well as Vera Mackie, ―Feminism in modern Japan : citizenship, embodiment, and 
sexuality‖ (2003), Barbara Sato, ―The new Japanese woman : modernity, media, and women in interwar Japan‖ 
(2003), Laura Dales, ―Feminist movements in contemporary Japan‖ (2009), among others. 
3
 Masako Ishii-Kuntz, "Japanese Fathers: Work Demands and Family Roles," in Men, Work, and Family, ed. 
Jane C. Hood (London and New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1993), 45. 
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increasing pool of research about masculinity in Japan. As Harry Brod puts it, ―the key to the 
gender gap lies in the study of men, not women.‖4 
Research question 
I believe that men‘s hegemonic gender role in Japan has been regarded as common sense so 
much so that the sociological and psychological aspects of their reality have been neglected 
and therefore in need of closer investigation. The question I would first and foremost like to 
ask is: Is the ongoing shift in masculine identity of young salarymen moving away from 
the hegemonic ideology which affected older generations? I will investigate this question 
in three areas: work, family, and life purpose. To reach a conclusion regarding this matter, I 
will address several support questions: 
 Which masculine ideologies have been central to Japanese culture since the Meiji 
Restoration (1868-1912), and what evidence can be found to demonstrate the changes 
in those ideologies until the present day? 
 Which modern masculine ideologies are emerging within the context of work? Are 
they similar to or different from the ideologies apparent in the context of family life 
and the context of individual life purpose, and why? 
 In what way are the emerging masculinity ideologies similar to or different from the 
masculinity ideologies prevalent among men belonging to earlier generations? 
Literature and sources 
Dasgupta has contributed substantially to the discourse of salaryman masculinity. In his 
article, ―Creating Corporate Warriors: The ‗salaryman‘ and masculinity in Japan‖ from 2003, 
he examined the representations of salaryman masculinity through pop culture and Japanese 
media. His conclusion was that the image of the salaryman has played a significant part in 
influencing post-war Japanese masculinity in general, essentially meaning that salaryman 
masculinity has become hegemonic through the influence of mass-media and pop culture. He 
notes, however, that there is still ―a general lack of recognition of the salaryman as a gendered 
construct‖5. Through this thesis, I aim to contribute to the discussion of salarymen as 
                                                 
4
 Harry Brod, "The Case for Men's Studies," in The Making of Masculinities: The New Men's Studies, ed. Harry 
Brod (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 47. 
5
 Romit Dasgupta, "Creating Corporate Warriors: The "Salaryman" and Masculinity in Japan," in Asian 
Masculinities: The Meaning and Practice of Manhood in China and Japan, ed. Kam Louie and Morris Low 
(London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 131. 
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gendered constructs by applying gender and masculinity theories to different aspects of 
salaryman life. The concept of hegemonic masculinity will cover large parts of the thesis and 
will serve as an overarching body of theory. 
Ishii-Kuntz‘ work extends over several decades. I have chosen to focus on two of her works, 
namely ―Japanese fathers: Work demands and family roles‖ from 1993 and ―Balancing 
fatherhood and work: Emergence of diverse masculinities in contemporary Japan‖ from 2003. 
In ―Japanese fathers‖, she discusses the ways in which families in Japan in the post-war 
period are characterised as ―fatherless‖, establishing that mothers‘ involvement in children‘s 
image of their fathers is instrumental.
6
 She argues that fathers are psychologically, but not 
physically present, and concludes that the act of spending more time with children alone will 
not be sufficient for producing a more gender-equal environment in Japanese families. In 
―Balancing fatherhood and work‖, she approaches ―child-caring‖ fathers by examining how 
they attempt to construct and maintain their masculinities.
7
 She reasons that fathers who 
participate actively in childcare and housework simultaneously with working full-time have to 
overcome many obstacles. She calls for a more extensive research on the increasingly diverse 
spectre of gender and masculinity identities in Japan, including the changes of salaryman 
masculinity. 
While I have largely based my research on salarymen who are childless and in their mid-
twenties, I will discuss in detail their prospects and expectations of fatherhood in their futures. 
I will also search for any indication of a change in attitude patterns to see if I can establish 
what kind of diverse elements at play in salaryman masculinity than the hegemonic ideal, 
presented for instance by Dasgupta. In chapter 6, ―Masculinity and family‖, I will rely heavily 
on Ishii-Kuntz‘ arguments about fatherhood, and the embodiment and perpetuation of fathers‘ 
hegemonic masculinity images through mothers‘ involvement in child rearing. 
In their compilation, ―Men and Masculinities in Contemporary Japan: Dislocating the 
salaryman doxa‖ from 2003, Roberson and Suzuki contribute to the increasing pool of 
literature about masculinities in Japan, touching upon a variety of different subjects, such as 
transgender practices, female masculinity, working-class masculinities and domestic violence, 
                                                 
6
 Ishii-Kuntz, "Japanese Fathers: Work Demands and Family Roles," 64-5. 
7
 Masako Ishii-Kuntz, "Balancing Fatherhood and Work: Emergence of Diverse Masculinities in Contemporary 
Japan," in Men and Masculinities in Contemporary Japan: Dislocating the Salaryman Doxa, ed. James E. 
Roberson and Nobue Suzuki (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 
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as well as fatherhood and salaryman masculinity.
8
 Of the articles in this anthology, I have 
also used Gordon Mathews‘ article, ―Can ‗a real man‘ live for his family? Ikigai and 
masculinity in today‘s Japan‖. Here, Mathews approaches the meaning behind Japanese 
masculinity, using the concept of ikigai (that which most makes life worth living)
9
 to argue 
that there are different, diverse ideas of masculinity which become apparent when examining 
what Japanese men consider worth living for. He finds that although there are emerging ideals 
of thinking of ikigai as family and self-fulfilment in the younger generations currently, he 
doesn‘t believe that this would become the norm in the future. He suspects that instead, it will 
only become harder for men to see any value in having families, and that they will slowly 
move away from the ideas of ikigai as family or self-fulfilment.  
Likewise, I have asked my interviewees their opinions about if they believe life alone is worth 
living for, and agree with Mathews, deducing a variety of different, emerging ideas of 
masculinity. However, I would consider myself slightly less cynical than Mathews, and will 
attempt to uncover whether my interviewees are overall more optimistic or pessimistic in 
regards to these issues. 
In 1994, Allison undertook an extensive study of salarymen, within the context of hostess 
clubs in Tokyo, the results of which she published in her book, ―Sexuality, Pleasure and 
Corporate Masculinity in a Tokyo Hostess Club‖. She examined how hostess clubs and 
similar establishments strengthened the social bonds between salarymen and how these social 
gatherings helped them develop unconditional, masculine bonds in a corporate context.
10
 
Though not directly relevant to my study, her book is one of the foremost important 
contributions to the discourse of masculinity in Japan. I will use some of her arguments in 
regards to gender boundaries between men and women in chapter 6, ―Masculinity and 
family‖. 
However, I am most heavily indebted to Hidaka and her book from 2010, ―Salaryman 
Masculinity: Continuity and Change in Hegemonic Masculinity in Japan‖. She conducted in-
                                                 
8
 James E. Roberson and Nobue Suzuki, "Introduction," in Men and Masculinities in Contemporary Japan: 
Dislocating the Salaryman Doxa, ed. James E. Roberson and Nobue Suzuki (London and New York: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). 
9
 Gordon Mathews, "Can 'a Real Man' Live for His Family? Ikigai and Masculinity in Today's Japan," in Men 
and Masuclinities in Contemporary Japan: Dislocating the Salaryman Doxa, ed. James E. Roberson and Nobue 
Suzuki (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 109. 
10
 Anne Allison, Nightwork: Sexuality, Pleasure and Corporate Masculinity in a Tokyo Hostess Club (Chicago 
and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
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depth interviews with three groups of men, of ages spanning an entire generation.
11
 All of 
these men have worked through crucial periods in the history of Japan. This body of work 
encapsulates broadly similar themes as my thesis: masculinity, family ideology and a similar 
approach to fieldwork. I feel a slight regret that this book did not exist until after I was 
finished with my fieldwork, as it would have proven to be most instrumental for my own 
research. Regardless, I will use several of her highly-relevant arguments to support my own in 
the different parts of the thesis. Hidaka touches upon many of the subjects presented above 
and adds an important comparative perspective through generations. My conclusions on 
whether or not there are ongoing shifts in salaryman masculinity ideology will build on her 
results. 
Hidaka outlined a variety of social and economic elements which factor into the changes now 
being experienced by the masculine hegemony in Japan, which I find relevant and will draw 
upon in this thesis. Specifically, she mentions the bursting of the bubble economy in the 
1990s, although I would argue that the financial crisis at the end of last decade and the 
Tōhoku earthquake of 2011 will be significant factors at play in the future as well. 
Additionally, she highlights changes in gender relations (in policy, as well as the general 
public), the rise of a variety of different labour categories divorced from the full-time work 
ideal, and alienation from wives and children, are all factors which posit challenges to 
hegemonic masculinity in Japan today. The question that remains is how to positively 
implement these changes on society and cope with these challenges in the future.
12
 I was 
intentionally future-oriented and interviewed twelve young salarymen who have not yet 
started their own families, but have strong intentions to do so. Through my interviews, I have 
attempted to discover how they aspire to overcome some of the challenges raised by Hidaka 
above. 
Finally, although my thesis and interviews are focused on Japan, in some aspects of the 
discussion I will refer to saellôrimaen in South Korea to offer a contrast or comparison. I 
have myself not had the privilege to conduct my own independent research in South Korea 
and consequently cannot conduct a fair, comparative analysis between the two countries. 
However, I believe the use of South Korea as a contrasting example offers an important 
perspective, which imparts a different way of seeing Japan‘s social system by confirming or 
                                                 
11
 Tomoko Hidaka, Salaryman Masculinity: The Continuity of and Change in the Hegemonic Masculinity in 
Japan (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), 6-7. 
12
 Ibid., 178. 
6 
 
refuting the social similarities between the two countries in this context. In regards to theory 
and empirical evidence, I will rely on the different articles in Laurel Kendall‘s book, ―Under 
Construction: The Gendering of Modernity, Class, and Consumption in the Republic of 
Korea‖ from 2002 and the article ―The Influence of Work Values on Job and Career 
Satisfaction and Organizational Commitment Among Korean Professional Level Employees‖ 
by Peter Kuchinke, Hye-Seung Kang, and Seok-Young Oh from 2008. 
Outline of thesis 
Chapter 2, ―Methodology‖, is concerned with methodological consideration. Here, I will 
present my choice of method and lay out the details of my fieldwork process. I will also 
address several challenges with qualitative research method and how I have opted to confront 
them, before briefly describing how I chose to analyse the interviews. 
Chapter 3, ―Theory‖, is an overview over the chief theories I plan to apply in order to be able 
to analyse the content of my interviews and answer my research questions most effectively. 
To be able to understand whether attitudes to masculinity are moving away from the 
hegemonic salaryman ideal or not, I will first introduce what the concept of hegemonic 
masculinity entails. In addition, theories on the ―breadwinner‖ ideal will be presented. To 
achieve an understanding for how shifts in gender identity can arise, I will use gender 
constructionist theory to argue that gender is something created, not inherent, before 
investigating the theory of gender role discrepancy. Furthermore, I will further attempt to 
elucidate how the two theories can explain gender identities evolving in diverse ways difficult 
to foresee with certainty. Finally, I shall explain the concept of gender boundaries, with which 
I intend to clarify some of the cases where change of attitudes is not to be found. 
Chapter 4, ―Masculinity through history‖, aims to answer my first support question: What 
masculine ideologies have been central to Japanese culture since the Meiji Restoration (1868-
1912), and what evidence can be found to show the changes in those ideologies until the 
present day? I believe that it is important to solidify the historical ground under my thesis in 
the context of masculine ideologies, before I delve into the analysis of my interviews. 
Chapter 5, ―Masculinity and work‖, will mainly be concerned with questions about work. I 
will start by presenting some of the views of my twelve interviewees which best represent 
attitudes towards masculinity in a work context, thereby showing what masculine ideologies 
7 
 
are currently evident or emerging within young salarymen. Dasgupta‘s article will no doubt 
be useful in this chapter. I will conclude the chapter through a comparison to Hidaka‘s 
research uncover whether there are any changes in attitudes to be found over time. 
Chapter 6, ―Masculinity and family‖, will primarily be concerned with questions about 
family. Again, I will draw upon the information gleaned from my interviewees which 
represent a variety of attitudes towards masculinity in a family context. This will outline 
which masculine ideologies are evident or emerging within young salarymen in regards to 
family life, with focus on their expectations and desires of their futures. The articles of Ishii-
Kuntz in particular will help me illustrate my points here. In order to establish a clear and 
tangible examples of changes to masculine hegemony, I will use Hidaka‘s invaluable research 
to see if I can uncover what kind of changes in these attitudes are found over time, then 
linking them to the attitudes to masculinity hegemony in the context of work, as outlined in 
chapter 5, ―Masculinity and work‖. 
Chapter 7, ―Masculinity and life purpose‖, will mainly be concerned with questions about 
individual life purpose. As in the previous two chapters, I intend to present some of the views 
of my interviewees best representing attitudes towards masculinity and identity in the context 
of their ideas about their own life purpose. Mathews‘ article will be a central instrument to 
support my conclusions. Moreover, I will examine the similarities or differences to the 
respondents in Hidaka‘s research to establish any potential change over time, linking them to 
the attitudes to the attitudes of my interviewees, as laid out in the previous chapters. 
In my last chapter, ―Conclusions‖, I will summarise all points I have been attempting to make 
throughout the thesis, before finally concluding upon a response to my main research 
question. 
Key notes 
On literature in the Japanese language 
I have not been able to rely on any Japanese literature, the reason being that I do not have 
proficiency in Japanese on an academic level, especially in written form. While I have 
conducted interviews in Japanese, they were all of a distinctly colloquial nature. Furthermore, 
I received a significant amount of help transcribing the interviews and translating them, which 
8 
 
I would not have been able to do on my own. My research is therefore limited to chiefly 
English literature overall, and some Scandinavian literature on methodology. 
Romanisation style 
I use the Hepburn style of romanisation, where long vowels are indicated by macrons to show 
the pronunciation of Japanese words and names, for example sengyō shufu (full-time 
housewife).  I italicise all concepts in Japanese, providing a translation in brackets the first 
time they are mentioned. 
Kindergartens 
When I discuss kindergartens anywhere in the thesis, I specifically refer to hoikuen (―child 
welfare facilities that conform to the Child Welfare Law‖13, designed to be a support 
institution for parents who are prevented in any way from raising their children full-time). 
Definition of salaryman and selection of participants 
According to Hidaka, male employees – both company workers and civil servants who 
receive a monthly salary – are typically considered to be salarymen.14 Her selections of 
research subjects, which she considers to fit the salaryman type, were middle-class white-
collar workers, employed in a large company. My selection of participants is similar, the only 
difference being  that I extended it to include men identifying with being a salaryman even if 
they are employed in a small-scale company. 
Introduction of respondents 
All names in this thesis are fictitious. I have chosen to use first names only. 
Nobuhiko. Mid-twenties, has worked in a large, prominent electronics company for three 
years. Not married, has a girlfriend. Interest in music, DJs on his free time. 
Hayato. Mid-twenties, has worked in a large insurance company for three years. Not married, 
has girlfriend. Interest in motorbikes and going to social events. 
                                                 
13
 Ishikawa City, "The Difference between Nursery (Hoikuen) and Kindergarten (Yochien) " Ishikawa City, 
http://www.city.ichikawa.lg.jp/english/guide/0134.html. 
14
 Hidaka, Salaryman Masculinity: The Continuity of and Change in the Hegemonic Masculinity in Japan, 1. 
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Shinji. Mid-twenties, has worked at a high-fashion department store, doing sales, for three 
years. Not married, no girlfriend. Interested in reading, fashion. 
Yoshio. Mid-twenties, has worked in a large, well reputed advertising company for three 
years. Engaged at the time of the interview, now married. Wife works full-time. 
Keitarō. Late-twenties, has worked in a tax consulting company for about four years. Married 
to a full-time housewife. 
Ryōta. Mid-twenties, has worked in a small, private advertising company for about two years. 
Not married, no girlfriend. Interested in fashion. 
Seiichi. Mid-twenties, has worked at the sales department in an IT-company for about three 
years. Started working in Tokyo and was transferred to Hiroshima about one year into his 
employment. Was on a leave of absence due to depression at the time of the interview, 
currently employed as a trainee in a political party (having quit his first job). Not married, no 
girlfriend. 
Takurō. Mid-twenties, has worked for three years at a floral export/import company. Not 
married, has girlfriend. 
Shigeo. Mid-twenties, has worked in a survey and statistics company for about three years. 
Not married, has girlfriend. 
Yōji. Mid-twenties, has worked in an advertising company for about three years. Recently 
changed jobs and is now employed at a different advertising company (international, Japanese 
branch). Not married, no girlfriend. Interested in music. 
Shūji. Mid-twenties, has worked at an American insurance company (Japanese branch) for 
about three years. Started working in Tokyo, was transferred to Hiroshima after about a year. 
Had girlfriend at the time of the interview, currently engaged.  
Tōru. Mid-twenties, worked for about one year in a human resource company before 
changing direction and starting working as an editor for a large TV-production company. Has 
worked there for about two years. Not married, no girlfriend. 
 
10 
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2 Methodology 
2.1 Choice of method 
When deciding what I would use as my primary method, I had to take into consideration the 
time available to me, and how to access potential informants. I was not able to do participant 
observation, nor an extensive statistical survey, for reasons that I will explain below. I felt I 
would get more insight into salarymen‘s thought processes if I conducted my own interviews, 
rather than using other researchers‘ empirical evidence. I chose to conduct semi-structured15 
interviews, which gave myself the freedom to speak to my informants without restraint, at the 
same time as which I had a pre-constructed question guide to serve as my anchor in case I 
encountered linguistic problems. The question guide can be found in the appendix of this 
thesis. 
2.1.1 Representation and reliability 
Doing qualitative in-depth interviews, some might argue that such a limited survey field 
cannot be representative for the social group in question, no matter how thoroughly one 
investigates the informants‘ lives. It is true that interviews are considered to be quite complex 
and uncertain in terms of data validity, as firstly, all data retained is at best a subjective 
rendition of the interviewee‘s experience, and secondly, the result depends on the 
interviewer‘s comprehension and analysis;16 however, the representation of a social group is 
not a goal of qualitative research method. The goal of the type of research I carried out 
through interviews is closer to finding representative samples of either someone who acts as 
an example of the group in question to an extreme, or someone who is more typical to the 
behaviour of the group.
17
 
                                                 
15
 An interview method where the questions are constructed beforehand, but the interview itself is less rigid, only 
following the questions and their structure where necessary, aiming for a smooth conversation about a given 
topic. See Carla Willig, Introducing Qualitative Research in Psychology: Adventures in Theory and Method 
(Berkshire: Open University Press, 2001), 21-2; Kristin G. Esterberg, Qualitative Methods in Social Research 
(McGraw-Hill, 2002), 87. 
16
 Eva Fägerborg, "Intervjuer," in Etnologiskt Fältarbete, ed. Lars Kaijser and Magnus Öhlander (Malmø: 
Studentlitteratur, 2009), 55; Katrine Fangen, Deltagende Observasjon (Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2004), 31. 
17
 Fangen, Deltagende Observasjon, 51; Willig, Introducing Qualitative Research in Psychology: Adventures in 
Theory and Method, 17; Tove Thagaard, Systematikk Og Innlevelse: En Innføring I Kvalitativ Metode, 2nd ed. 
(Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2002), 55. 
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I did not have the opportunity to do any participant observation during my field work, first of 
all because I had a limited amount of time (only three weeks) available to spend on research 
in Japan, and the preparation and execution of participant observation often requires several 
months, or even years, to be successful.
18
 A second problem which presented itself with my 
participant observation in a Japanese male-dominated work place was my gender and 
nationality. The overbearing feeling was that I would probably not be able to actually relate to 
or take part in the men‘s business – i.e. as a financial analyst (et cetera), because I would 
require proper training, native level language skills and knowledge in finance. Instead, I 
would be better suited to work with women, who do work that requires less training and 
experience (secretary, assistant) and is much more befitting to a temporary guest such as 
myself. However, this would have defeated the purpose of my research, as I am trying to 
focus on the lives of men, rather than women. 
To add to this, I would argue that I have been doing a form of participant observation by 
living in or visiting Japan and frequenting predominantly male groups over the course of over 
four years. Although I have not set a foot in their work environment per se, I have been to 
countless after-work get-togethers, parties, coffee meetings, and so on, where inevitably, I 
found, the topic of salarymen was addressed. Therefore, I personally believe that the lack of 
pre-organised research-based participant observation has not significantly impaired my 
analyses. 
Finally, I chose not to do an extensive statistical survey, because although I do have many 
contacts in Japan who could help me, I do not think that I could get more than at best a couple 
of hundred replies with the time I had available. Furthermore, this would be counter-
productive when I argue representation later on in this thesis. I have rather chosen to use 
official statistics published by the UN, the OECD, The World Bank, The International Labour 
Office and The Ministry of Health and Labour in Japan, which are far more reliable. 
Consequently, I have chosen to do a qualitative, rather than quantitative study. 
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2.2 The fieldwork process 
2.2.1 Preparations for the fieldwork 
In the past four years, I have lived in Japan for extended periods of time (a total of two years), 
as well as returning on numerous occasions. As a result, I have become quite familiar with 
many cultural aspects of Japan, and the ways of communication between foreigners and 
natives. This has worked to my advantage for field work, as although I only had three weeks 
to conduct research I did not need to waste any time getting used to my surroundings and 
establishing relationships to informants. 
I limited my research informants to be men between 25 and 30 years of age who do not yet 
have any children, but may or may not be involved with someone or be married. The reason 
for this was that I wanted to be future-oriented, emphasising young salarymen‘s views on 
what they believed their future to become, and the ways in which they aspired to cope with 
concerns lying in wait for them. Furthermore, it was important to me to interview salarymen 
as young as I could find so that any potential change in attitudes would be as apparent as 
possible. Usually, salarymen are by definition men who work in medium-to-large companies 
but I extended my choice of participants to men who identified as being salarymen, not 
necessarily men who fit into a prescribed definition of the concept. All of these men would 
have at least a bachelor‘s degree, as it is usually a prerequisite to get a well-paying full-time 
job. 
Choosing informants was fairly unproblematic. All of the informants in my study are men I 
have become acquainted with through my husband
19
 and he functioned as a gatekeeper – a 
person central to the group of people to be studied
20
 – for me throughout the process. Every 
informant was someone who my husband had either studied with or worked with, and has 
always been on good terms with. He contacted every informant for me and made 
appointments for us, where he would join us and where we after the interview would spend 
time together at leisure. We started the process of contact about two months prior to arriving 
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in Japan. Every person we approached was positive and interested in the project, and was 
quick to agree to participate. 
The only significant obstacle we could anticipate was that it would be difficult to make a 
specific schedule. Even though we had notified every informant well in advance of the 
interviews, they had no way of booking a specific date and time as far in advance as a few 
months. We ended up having to make appointments only a few days prior, or sometimes even 
on the same day, as the actual interview. The reason was ironic considering the topic of this 
thesis: since my informants are so busy with work they have little time to spare. There was 
also the practicality of direct contact, which is far easier from a Japanese phone rather than 
email or any other less efficient medium. 
Most of the informants agreed that this research project was well timed, as all of them had 
been employed for a few years, offering the time to reflect over their situations and their roles 
as salarymen. At the same time, not so much time had elapsed that they had started to become 
disenchanted or exhausted, which would produce negativity in the interviews. In their 
opinion, at this point in time, I would get the most objective results possible through these 
interviews. 
From March 18
th
 to April 05
th
 2010, I conducted nine in-depth interviews with twelve 
individuals. All interviews were one-on-one, except one interview where I interviewed three 
interviewees at once, and two interviews where my husband was present. All interviews were 
conducted in Japanese, except for the interview with my eleventh informant, where he 
requested to be interviewed in English. 
I originally decided to do all the interviews one-on-one without any interference, having 
agonised over what effect it would have to have my husband present (an obvious choice in 
interview companionship). However, my seventh subject had only a few weeks prior opted to 
take a year-long sabbatical from his job due to depression caused by work stress. I felt it was 
crucial to have my husband present at this particular meeting. I was anxious that I would 
accidentally say something upsetting to my interviewee at such an early stage of his 
depression, because of confusing linguistic nuances, the possibility of which made me feel 
considerably uneasy. 
As a result of this issue, I changed my method and strategy very quickly and as it happened, 
this interview went from being just the three of us, to becoming a group interview. Two of our 
15 
 
friends, whom I hadn‘t interviewed yet and by sheer luck, had not made an appointment with 
either, arrived unexpectedly at the scene. My husband upheld a balance between us and 
served as a controller in case I said something inappropriate or strange. Tove Thaagard, a 
Norwegian methodologist, mentions that group interviews can be really useful, as she argues 
that the people in the group can boost each other‘s confidence, help each other remember 
things and ask each other things that the interviewer wouldn‘t have thought about beforehand. 
On the other hand, she also says that if there is a dominant person present in the group, that 
person‘s views can override the other members.21 
In this instance, both of Thaagard‘s arguments proved themselves to have basis in reality. 
Sometimes, the men present would keep asking each other questions in genuine interest, 
constantly getting into new topics. Other times, however, a single person would dominate the 
conversation, so that my husband and I had to moderate the discussion and ask everyone‘s 
opinion in turn. Because my husband has had personal experience with being a salaryman, I 
could often manage to observe the conversations from a bird‘s eye view, in essence doing a 
form of participant observation. 
What I took away from this situation was how important it was to take notice and read the 
atmosphere in the room more keenly than if the interview were only one-on-one. This 
interview was a great success, which made me consider having my husband present at other 
interviews as well. 
Having my husband present at later interviews proved to be very helpful, linguistically 
speaking. However, there were moments in the two later interviews where I felt like the 
interviewees were no longer communicating with me, but instead were naturally opting to 
speak with my husband, which contributed somewhat to me faltering and losing track 
noticeably more than before. The participants were constantly turning to him. This was most 
likely to ensure that they were being understood, but as I was conducting the interviews, the 
situation came out of balance, with my authority as interviewer being undermined. 
Regardless, I received very interesting results from both these interviews, in part because my 
husband was acutely aware of the purpose of the interview and asked all the right questions. 
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2.2.2 Betwixt and between – the issue of objectivity 
While preparing the fieldwork for this thesis, I was constantly reminded that one should be 
wary of studying and interviewing someone one knows personally, and particularly someone 
one knows well. At the very least, we are asked to seriously consider our emotional 
attachment to the area of study or the people, as it can have consequences for the research.
22
 I 
definitely had to consider from which stance I had to interview my informants, as I had been 
introduced to every informant through my husband, and some of them were already my 
friends on a personal level, so I could never delve into this project from a distance with an 
entirely objective point of view. 
The more I interviewed people, however, the more I found that knowing someone well in 
Japan in fact worked as an advantage, rather than disadvantage, to conduct a more successful 
interview. Methodologists stress that if the informants do not have confidence in the 
researcher, the results of the research might become as superficial as their relationship with 
each other is, and the answers will not be as honest as they should be.
23
 This is one of the 
reasons why participant observation can provide more insight into the informants lives than 
what only interviews can do. From this point of view, I had a great advantage during my 
fieldwork. In Japan, developing a close relationship with someone can often take a 
considerably long time. I knew roughly half of my interviewees for three to four years prior, 
but it was not until I‘d known them for two years that they started to become comfortable 
with me. 
The rest of the interviewees were comfortable with me because I was already vouched for and 
because they had met me on several occasions beforehand, even if we had not become 
personally close yet. An additional possible contributor to their willingness to accept me as 
part of their friend group was my capacity in the Japanese language and willingness to learn. 
In this sense, I believe I could produce more or less the same results (in some cases, perhaps 
better) as I would have, if I were to do participant observation and then interviews in a group 
of people unknown to me in Japan. 
During my time living in Japan, I would constantly fluctuate between belonging to insider- 
and outsider-groups. I could never be a fully-fledged salaryman and of course, I could never 
be a man. However, I have since the start been treated differently than Japanese women by 
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my husband‘s friends, who would later become my friends and informants. It was as if it was 
always okay for me to act like a man, because I was, after all, not Japanese and could not be 
expected to start acting like Japanese women do just because I was in the country. It was 
accepted that I acted much more similar to them, because I was from Scandinavia, a strongly 
liberal place, and so, paradoxically, I became both an insider and an outsider in the group all 
at once. 
In sum, my gender became less emphasised, but my nationality grew in importance, thus, I 
would argue, balancing my relationship to my informants. If I were to consider how it 
affected their interviews, I would say that my nationality and background were far more 
essential than my gender was, because even though my topic was gender and masculinity in a 
Japanese work environment, the idea of the reputed Scandinavian welfare state might have 
put much more pressure on them as to what I might think about their opinions. All in all, I had 
to exercise a great deal of personal reflexivity to distinguish between which part of me and 
my background affected each interview in particular. 
There are certain advantages to being a complete outsider, such as being able to ask strange 
and unusual questions which might come across as naïve or rude if asked by a native. As an 
outsider, I was not expected to know how everything works
24
, and it gave me the chance to 
hear more of a critique of the environment than an insider would, because as an outsider, I 
could not relate to the environment in the same way.
25
 I was relatively free to challenge 
accepted truths, or what is otherwise called atarimae (something natural, reasonable, or 
otherwise known as ‗common sense‘) in Japan.  
I found myself both having to bear the burden of knowing the inner workings of the social 
pressure a salaryman has to endure, being married to an ex-salaryman, as well as receiving 
forgiveness when I would ask questions to explore further into otherwise common and natural 
concepts because I was, after all, not a salaryman myself, nor would I ever be.  
In some cases, I also heard some criticisms on the salaryman way of life, which was 
unsurprising. However, more importantly, all interviewees were keen to talk about how they 
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were riddled with dilemmas on what was considered to be a more positive and productive 
way to live – moreso than being desperate to complain about their way of life to me.  
The disadvantages to being an outsider in Japan – and being an outsider basically means 
being a foreigner – is most of all that foreigners are thought of by the general population as 
someone who will never understand the true essence of Japan and the way Japanese people 
live their lives. A common way to describe this notion is by the concept of nihonjinron. At the 
root of nihonjinron lies a basis for comparison of the ―unique‖ culture of Japan, as opposed to 
all other cultures.
26
 It builds on the constructed assumption that Japan is homogenous in 
culture, language and lifestyle. In a conversation with a Japanese counterpart, this common 
assumption that outsiders cannot ever understand the true essence of Japan has a tendency to 
make them proudly emphasise the greatness and beauty of their hard-working lifestyle, even 
though in reality, they might be having a hard time. That is not to say that all Japanese people 
feel this way, but it is worth to take note that there might be such a possibility. 
This points to the very common issue of honne and tatemae, with tatemae being the face and 
opinions you show on the outside, and honne being your true intentions and feelings which 
usually stay on the inside.
27
 In some of my interviews, this became more apparent than in 
others, which obscured my analysis somewhat and confused my judgement of whether they 
were truly happy with their life as it was, or if they were just trying to show me that it‘s not as 
bad as I thought (assuming, of course, that I thought it was ―bad‖ in the first place). 
Kirin Narayan has an interesting discussion on what it means to be a ―native‖ anthropologist 
and the validity of this concept. Ultimately, I agree with Narayan‘s point in that we should not 
view anthropologists (or researchers) as either ―native‖ or ―non-native‖, but instead 
acknowledge each and every person‘s sum of significant factors such as education, gender, 
class, experience, and background in general and what in particular that person might bring to 
their research.
28
 From an alternative perspective, I might have been viewed as a 
―Scandinavian‖ in Japanese eyes, but at the same time, anyone I interviewed knew that firstly 
I do not even come from Scandinavia originally, being a second generation immigrant from 
Russia. Secondly, I am married to a Japanese man and am integrated into a Japanese family. 
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Therefore, I do not think that anyone could ever have considered me as either an outsider or 
an insider – I was simply a mixture of both. In other words, it is possible to argue that I 
transcend the native/non-native dichotomy. 
2.2.3 Linguistic challenges 
Foreign researchers in Japan are adamant about the importance of having a command of the 
language when conducting research in Japan, as opposed to having an interpreter present
29
 
and I would add that this counts for research in most countries where the dominant language 
is a non-European one. I have confidence in my skills in Japanese when it comes to everyday 
conversations, which has lead me to believe that I could challenge myself to do whole 
interviews with native speakers, but not so much confidence that I could take notes and 
remember everything in full. Therefore, I decided to record the interviews so that I could 
transcribe and double check every word and sentence later. I also had to reflect on the fact 
that I might have missed out on a great deal of good points coming from the informants 
because I didn‘t judge their tone of voice correctly or catch the nuance they were casually 
directing at me, thus sometimes leading me by chance towards misrepresenting their ideas.  
Japanese is a highly contextual language, with a great variety of underlying meanings in even 
the simplest of sentences. After I had transcribed all the interviews and had them quality 
checked, I realised that there were many matters I could have delved into deeper and many 
occasions where there was an invitation for being asked more questions, which I blatantly 
missed. Then, there is the issue of my Japanese natural response – it is indeed limited. 
Whereas in Norwegian, English or Russian, I am able to react to people‘s emotions and 
respond accordingly, I do not yet have that skill in Japanese, which could have potentially 
made the informants feel a little left at bay, having given a part of themselves, but not being 
caught at the right time. 
I was probably never truly inappropriate and I have never experienced a Japanese person 
being unforgiving when I said something grammatically incorrect, but I nevertheless felt 
uneasy about not using every opportunity for a better interview. But in the end, it is said that 
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linguistic fluency is not what reflects upon the final result of the research
30
 and I agree – 
whatever linguistic limitations I might have had, they play only a minor role in this 
experience. 
2.2.4 The issue of confidentiality and informed consent 
I always made sure that every informant knew that I would make them anonymous, not 
revealing their names, occupations, or company names. Generally, this was never an issue or 
concern in most cases, with the exception of the last interview, where I managed to talk about 
company names by mistake at the café we were and the informant felt immediately uneasy 
because he felt the café was too close to his work place, and was anxious about the chance of 
a colleague showing up in the same café. We came to the conclusion that it did not matter in 
the long run as he never said anything negative or strange about his company, but it did 
contribute to a slight disruption in the interview. 
In a different interview, the interviewee told me things he would attempt to do which were, in 
fact, legally questionable. I was very surprised that he would reveal such information while 
being recorded, but he seemed entirely unabashed by this matter and frankly informed me of 
everything with detail. He never asked me to keep this information specifically confidential 
either, probably assuming that I automatically would anyway. I have not revealed any aspects 
of this information in the thesis. 
In regards to informed consent, I believed it was important to ensure that every participant 
was told as much as possible about my project. At that time, I still had not developed the form 
of my thesis – as it happens, it was evolving while I was interviewing people, with new ideas 
emerging every day. I was, however, always open and clear about my intentions. Some of my 
informants did not fully understand the concept of an academic thesis of this magnitude, 
because they were not familiar with such projects themselves, but this did not contribute to 
any of them stepping down from our agreement. None of the informants ever minded being 
recorded on tape, but some did make sure that I would not reveal names or more importantly, 
company names, when I would release my thesis to the public. 
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2.3 Analysis 
My question guide was divided into four categories: 1) Work, 2) Spouse/partnership, 3) 
Father/family and 4) General. After transcribing and translating the interviews, I found that 
the category of ―Spouse/partnership‖ blended well together with the ―Father/family‖ category, 
and that the ―General‖ category, which initially was to serve as a summary, became a new 
category altogether, where the informants extensively discussed the dilemma of choosing 
between work and family/private time. The chief category which yielded the most results for 
this thesis was ―Father/family‖. The ―Work‖ category was useful in terms of orientation 
around the informants‘ work lives and their views on company rules and regulations, as well 
as the state. From each interview, I picked out the most useful quotes and comments and 
sorted them into smaller categories, to be able to see every conversation from a new point of 
view. To be able to best answer my research questions, I finally divided the main discussion 
into three parts, where the first part discusses the informants‘ masculinity within the context 
of work, the second part discusses their masculinity within the context of family, and the third 
part discusses their masculinity within the context of individual life purpose. 
22 
 
3 Theory 
In this chapter, I will present the main bodies of theory I will utilise for analysing the 
interviews I conducted. First of all, I will outline the concept of hegemonic masculinity, 
which is central to my argument, discussing both its inception into common academic 
discourse, and the criticisms it has faced as a theory. Then I will briefly touch on some of the 
theory concerning the ideal of ―breadwinning‖ and what it entails. 
In the second part of this chapter, I will present a breakdown of social constructionist gender 
theories, to lay the foundation for discussing salarymen as a gendered construct, which 
Dasgupta sought. Later, I will outline gender discrepancy theory, so as to later link together 
the hegemonic masculinity and social constructionist theories, showing that in symbiosis, 
these two theories can establish reasons for change in gender identity, an argument which 
Ishii-Kuntz in particular asks for. Finally, I will present gender boundary theory, which will 
assist me in explaining why in some cases, change in gender identity is not evident or even 
going in the opposite direction of where I initially hypothesised it to go. In these cases, I 
believe Mathews‘ article can be of particular use. 
3.1 Masculinity theory 
3.1.1 Hegemonic masculinity 
To lay grounds for discussing the different forms of masculinity, I would first of all like to 
borrow Jack S. Kahn‘s definition: ―Masculinity is […] the complex cognitive, behavioral, 
emotional, expressive, psychosocial, and sociocultural experience of identifying with being 
male.‖31 There are several different types of masculinities and the most prominent ones are 
‗hegemonic masculinity‘, ‗complicit masculinity‘ and ‗subordinate masculinity‘. Before 
delving into the concept of ‗hegemonic masculinity‘, I would like to explain that ‗complicit 
masculinity‘ is a masculinity that is not dominant in society but supports dominant 
(hegemonic) masculinity. It hopes to be rewarded for being similar to or supportive of the 
dominant group, but knows that it will never be dominant itself. ‗Subordinate masculinity‘ is 
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a masculinity that is subjugated (defeated) and will never be considered a legitimate form of 
masculinity.
32
 
R.W. Connell, an Australian sociologist specialising in the area of masculinities, constructed 
the concept of ‗hegemonic masculinity‘, which essentially derived from Antonio Gramsci‘s 
analysis of class relations. Drawing upon the Marxist idea that ―man is not ruled by force 
alone, but also by ideas‖33, Gramsci extended the sentiment to these ideas coming from a 
whole, dominant class in society, thereby exercising this hegemony on the less powerful 
classes below. Connell defines hegemonic masculinity as ―the configuration of gender 
practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of 
patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the 
subordination of women.‖34 In other words, it means that hegemonic masculinity is a 
dominant, normative form of masculinity, but that it is in fact rarely representative in the 
majority of men. It represents common ideals, fantasies and desires, such as heterosexuality, 
self-control and control of others, producing a contradiction between what men actually are 
versus what they want to be.
35
 Hegemonic masculinity ―does not reflect the true nature of 
men‖ and increases the chance of conflict when men are demanded by society to live up to 
―an impossible standard‖.36 Most centrally to the concept of hegemonic masculinity, perhaps, 
is that most men – even those not belonging to the category – will benefit from the 
subordination of women and other masculinities.
37
  
Hegemonic masculinity does not imply that men belonging to the dominant group are 
necessarily economically powerful. There is more to the concept of hegemony than mere 
economic control. It is true that by gaining economic power, the dominant group is enabled to 
enforce its own ideologies on others, and hegemony does often originate in this way. 
However, as it can be argued that ultimately all men in general can benefit from this ideology 
if they so wish, economic power cannot be seen as a prerequisite for hegemonic masculinity 
today. Furthermore, in order for hegemonic masculinity to persist and be maintained, it needs 
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consent from men (belonging to the ―subordinated‖ and ―complicit‖ masculinity categories) 
and women, thus making hegemonic masculinity stable, but contested and subject to 
change.
38
 
Seeing it in a different light, Mimi Schippers writes that in order for hegemonic masculinity to 
continue being legitimate it needs to remain unavailable to women. This means that ―feminine 
characteristics must be defined as deviant and stigmatized‖.39 Masculine work, for instance, is 
generally unavailable to women, because they will at some point have to ―quit‖ for child-
related reasons, and will eventually meet the ―glass ceiling‖. Schipper‘s point is that 
hegemonic masculinity cannot exist without hegemonic femininity, meaning that there are 
forms of femininity which are dominant and overbearing on the same level as masculinity is. 
Additionally, when masculine traits, such as aggression or promiscuity, are applied to women, 
they manifest as warped or ‗wrong‘, as they represent a threat to the dominance of hegemonic 
masculinity. 
 
All of this is not to say that the hegemonic masculinity paradigm is an uncontested, 
universally accepted theory. Some of the main criticisms towards the concept are based on the 
fact that masculinity is far too complex to simplify it in this way, and that it is not productive 
to divide masculinity into such few categories when men‘s realities and psyche‘s consist of 
aspects from every category in the masculinity hierarchy defined by Connell.
40
 As Jeff Hearn 
puts it, every category of masculinity in every social institution ―intersects with, complements 
and contradicts each other‖.41 Another argument against this system is that the suggestion that 
the concept of hegemonic masculinity can only be used as a tool in theory, but cannot be 
applied to real life situations in practice.
42
 According to critics like Margaret Wetherell, if 
hegemonic masculinity is not meant to be able to describe ‗real men‘, only the ideal of the 
‗real man‘ and the social norms surrounding it, it is still not clear exactly what hegemonic 
masculinity actually is. I agree with the notion that masculinities are far too complex to be 
generalised, but I nevertheless found it useful in the context of an East Asian phenomenon. I 
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would argue that the vagueness of the concept is necessary in order to be able to detach it 
from Western specifics and apply it to discourse of salarymen. 
 
In most capitalist cultures, what has been considered a hegemonic form of masculinity, has 
been the ―breadwinner‖. This also applies to Japan and South Korea, and I will now briefly 
outline what constitutes the ―breadwinner‖ role, as it is essential to my discussion. 
3.1.2 The “breadwinner” role 
According to Suzanne J. Kessler and Wendy McKenna, a role is defined as: 
 
―…a set of prescriptions and proscriptions for behavior – expectations about what behaviors are 
appropriate for a person holding a particular position within a particular social context. A gender role, 
then, is a set of expectations about what behaviors are appropriate for people of one gender.‖43 
 
The ―breadwinner role‖, then, describes what kind of behaviour and demeanour has been, and 
often still is, expected of men in the social context of family life, defining their life worth in 
terms of occupational and economic success. The concept of men as breadwinners in its 
modern form arose from the industrial revolution in Britain, when the notions of establishing 
households, protecting the home and providing for the family became commonplace, dividing 
the female and the male realms into the private and the public respectively. Before the 
revolution, any business the household might have endeavoured to do, such as farm work, 
would often have included the labour of the whole extended family.
44
 
The idea of being a good father has become directly linked to being a reliable economic 
provider, relieving their family, particularly their wives, of economic stress.
45
 Lynne Segal 
reminds us of the fifties, where even psychoanalytic literature would express the need of 
separate male and female spheres ―for the sake of the child‘s mental health‖.46 The father was 
there solely for financial support, and was not a social member of the family the vast majority 
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of the time. By the time of the seventies, most women were starting to be expected to 
(continue to) work, even if they had children.
47
 Nowadays, it almost seems as if it is in the 
minority to want to be a full-time housewife, at least in most Western countries, however the 
breadwinner ideal still stands strong. Victor J. Seidler mentions that traditionally, men or 
fathers thought that their authority would be undermined if they became emotionally close to 
their children. The ideal father would be distant – providing, but controlling. Seidler also says 
that men had a tendency to underappreciate the amount of ―emotional work‖48 that is required 
to raise children and to have a family, their identities being organised around and tied to their 
jobs.
49
 
Jean L. Potuchek, an American gender theorist, emphasises that breadwinning means more 
than simply having paid employment and thus being an economic provider to the family – it is 
also about the sense of obligation to one‘s family. Because of this sense of obligation, it 
becomes problematic to leave the work place for extended periods (for example paternal 
leave).
50
 Simply being paid for a service does not necessarily constitute a breadwinning role – 
a woman may, for instance, work part-time and get paid, but she will not be considered as a 
breadwinner for the family. One needs to identify with being the adult who directly supports 
and contributes to the family in a financial context, not one who contributes temporarily or 
partly, or who just earns extra pocket money for themselves. 
3.2 Gender theory 
3.2.1 “Doing gender” – social constructionism 
Candace West and Don H. Zimmermann wrote in 1987
51
 about gender being something we 
are ―doing‖, contrary to what we ―are‖, a theory which was in part made famous by Judith 
Butler in her book, ―Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity‖ from 1990, 
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where she established the idea of gender performativity on the same principles.
52
 According 
to these theories, gender is something produced by society and its various social institutions, 
rather than by the individuals themselves. It is not a role in itself, but a product of social 
interaction – something that is seen as ―natural‖ while being continually reproduced. 
Individuals, in a sense, act out the institutional expectations of masculine and feminine traits 
through interaction with each other. Gender becomes a form of rationalisation of these social 
expectations and thereby, legitimises, as West and Zimmermann put it, ―one of the most 
fundamental divisions of society‖.53 This social constructionist view suggests that individuals, 
in their reproduction of the ―essentialness‖ of gender, are acutely aware of their social 
positioning. In Cynthia Epstein‘s words, some individuals and institutions receive more 
power than others and all social ordering of gender is ―maintained through the interplay 
between social constraints and individuals choices‖.54 
Potuchek also says that it is when we study or observe the actual everyday life, that we find 
the ubiquity of gender construction or reproduction in society.
55
 Potuchek argues that certain 
individuals‘ choices are not entirely responsible for the reproduction and construction of 
gender ideas, because institutions will constrain and limit their choices.
56
 According to her 
some individuals or groups are better equipped to negotiate than others, with more bargaining 
power and resources. Individuals cannot be wholly blamed for inequality. She does add, 
however, that the construction of gender is not necessarily inevitably reproduced. Rather, 
because it ultimately depends on individuals for its reproduction and maintenance, it is not 
unthinkable that the same individuals might shape the gender system into something entirely 
different, given due time. I think her arguments here are important in order to be able to 
illustrate any potential change and the reasons why it may occur. I agree with her in how even 
though institutions may construct and provide gender ideologies into the public, and 
individuals may reproduce and perpetuate these ideologies, it is still up to the individuals to 
initiate a change. 
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3.2.2 Gender role discrepancy 
Clearly defined by Kahn, gender role discrepancy is ―a discrepancy (or difference) between 
your ideal self, what is idealised (desired), and your real self, or what is actually attained.‖57 
Originally a concept coined by Joseph H. Pleck, who in turn drew inspiration from Erving 
Goffman and Margaret Mead, gender role discrepancy or gender role strain implies that 
masculinity constructed by society is an ideal often strived for, yet seldom reached by most 
men.
58
 What arises from a gender role discrepancy is an inner conflict felt by the men in 
question who find themselves unable to reach their desired potential.
59
 
Many men evaluate this discrepancy as a fault of their own, as they may have problems 
adjusting to the rapid changes of society and societal ideology (for instance equal working 
rights for women). When they find themselves unable to meet the unrealistic or inconsistent 
demands imposed on them (mostly by other men), they will be socially reprimanded and will 
instead exaggerate their own personal ideal of masculinity, trying as hard as possible to 
conform to it.
60
 Some men may feel a need to be ―in control‖ of their own lives and reality, 
which makes admitting to any insecurities a potential threat to their masculinity. Instead, to 
keep up their appearance, such men may internalise their anxieties in fear that they will 
otherwise be rejected by their peers.61 When the men in question fail to meet expectations of 
them, for instance as the good provider, they often experience a ‗discrepancy strain‘, which in 
turn can drive them to reinforcing the stereotype they cannot attain.
62
 
3.2.3 Gender boundaries 
Judith M. Gerson and Kathy Peiss are essentially of the same view as the social 
constructionists, but they also discuss the concept of gender boundaries. They argue that there 
are distinct boundaries between women and men, and that women and men are constantly 
undergoing negotiation between one another, or participating in some form of domination or 
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power play across these boundaries.
63
 This theory also ascribes to there being a high gender 
consciousness within the actors, but as I interpret it there is also an emphasis on the fact that 
men are not always necessarily in power or control. Both women and men have their own 
domains, separated by borders which power is negotiated across. Gerson and Peiss say that 
this is a ―multidimensional process‖, meaning it is not as simple as only society constructing 
gender relations, which are later reproduced in a continuing spiral; there are many more 
elements at work. 
 
Traditionally and very simply put, women have been assigned to the domestic realm and men 
have been assigned to the public one. However, in the last few decades, the separation 
between domains have become blurred because of each gender entering a sphere previously 
dominated by the other – women have been ―invited‖ to work alongside men and men have 
been ―invited‖ to take more part in child upbringing. The respective domains are still, 
perhaps, dominated by the gender initially assigned to it, but far less distinctly than before. 
Nevertheless, there is still social and cultural prestige in question – even though men and 
women physically cross the boundaries of traditional gender roles into the sphere of work or 
home, they are not inherently confident that it is ―right‖. Gerson and Peiss argue that the 
invitation and participation across borders will not ―necessarily lead to lasting structural 
change‖.64 People can cross each other‘s borders physically, but that does not inevitably mean 
that they have taken each other‘s roles and expectations upon themselves. People are still 
expected to carry out their socially inherent role, while they ―try on‖ each other‘s ―lives‖.  
 
If women are to take upon themselves a ―man‘s‖ job, there is still a level of expectation of 
them taking care of children and the household as before, and furthermore, if a man decided 
to take care of the household and children more than earlier, they is still some expectation to 
continue to work as hard as they always have done. In other words, there is no room for the 
gender roles to shift from one to another; there is too much social consciousness and too many 
connotations ascribed to one‘s birth sex. By reducing the issue in this way, it is helpful in 
finding the root of it. 
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Potuchek draws on Gerson and Peiss‘ theory on gender boundaries, defining it further by 
saying that gender boundaries are ―anything that marks, and thereby constructs, the difference 
between ‗real men‘ and ‗real women‘.‖65 She argues that these boundaries are actively 
engaged in defining and creating a system of inequality. The primary difference between the 
two definitions is that Gerson and Peiss are not as focused on inequality, but more focused on 
the fact that there are boundaries to be crossed which create a potential for change. Potuchek 
is more pessimistic, highlighting how such boundaries reproduce inequality, and agrees that 
gender boundaries are dynamic, but that moving between the spheres across boundaries will 
not necessarily be a catalyst of fundamental change to the structure as a whole. 
 
Potuchek calls breadwinning a ―contested gender boundary.‖ 66 Mothering, to her, is the 
opposing force to breadwinning. It too is a gender role, but in this instance it is one which is 
inherently feminine, and is uncontested from the breadwinner‘s side. As part-time work for 
women is not considered to be authentic ―breadwinning‖, the act of fathers taking care of their 
children too is not always considered to be ―proper‖ child rearing. Potuchek uses the example 
of a mother bathing a child being seen as an appropriate parenting routine, whilst a father 
doing the exact same act, is thought to be ―babysitting‖.67 In other words, as I see it, there is 
more to be done than the simple act of physically crossing over each boundary – there needs 
to be an ideological change on both sides. 
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4 Masculinity through history 
In this chapter, I will account for relevant, important moments in Japanese history ranging 
from the beginning of last century until the present day, in the context of gender, or more 
specifically, masculinity ideologies. I will first write a brief summary of Japanese history, 
before I explain some of the main aspects of contemporary salaryman reality. 
4.1 Historical overview 
4.1.1 Meiji and governmental gender construction 
The Meiji Restoration started in 1868, when Japan completely opened up to trade and 
welcomed new, European and American customs and policies after limiting access from other 
countries for several centuries. The Japanese government became increasingly persistent in 
using the imported Western ideologies and values in almost every aspect of society. These 
were thought to be the pinnacle of civilisation and a symbol of modernism, and were used as 
models to prove the government‘s ability to be progressive, as opposed to the other East 
Asian countries.
68
 Traditionally, the Japanese family or household had been three-
generational, patrilineal and patrilocal, otherwise known as ie.
69
 The ie system was 
constructed in the Tokugawa period (1503-1868)
70
 and was based on the Confucian hierarchy 
philosophy, where the aged preceded over the youth and men preceded over women. In 1896, 
a civil code was put into effect, legalising the patriarchal family structure which would serve 
as the new ideology of the nuclear family.
71
 Gender roles were now being constructed 
specifically and purposefully to build a strong, national identity.
72
 
Women‘s moral education came to be regarded as essential to the growth and development of 
the country. Prior to the Restoration, women were seldom given any specific legal or political 
rights, even though they had always participated in the labour force, working side by side 
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with men. It was only when the Meiji state was established that there appeared a clear 
division between female and male labour.
73
 Women were taught that they were now a 
necessary component to the sustenance of the family. A new ideology of ryōsai kenbo (good 
wife, wise mother) was constructed by the state where women‘s roles as wife and their ability 
to upkeep a household were central to their existence.
74
 To the government, this was equality 
at its best, where both men and women were seen as independent and important, but as we 
know, this would lead to women becoming confined in the home and depending on men for 
financial support. Consequently, women were seen as independent or literate enough to 
maintain their household on their own, but were still judged to be legally and politically 
incompetent.
75
 
Morris Low tells us about the direct transformations in representative images of Japanese men 
as Japan became increasingly modernised. The state initiated a form of Westernisation, or 
―caucasianisation‖ of the Japanese in order to differentiate between Japan and the rest of East 
Asia so that the world would see that Japan was becoming a ―world power worthy of 
respect.‖76 Low describes intentional depictions of ―Japanese versus Chinese‖ on woodblock 
prints about the Sino-Japanese (1894-5) and Russo-Japanese wars (1904-5), where Japanese 
became increasingly indistinguishable from their Caucasian partners, while Chinese, for 
instance, were depicted as ―Oriental barbarians‖. Men were told to rely on their physical skill 
in pursuit of true masculinity, rather than brute force. In their home, men exercised a legal 
authority over their families according to the ie system, and had a lot of time in which to do 
so.
77
 
In other words, the Japanese have built their society and gender ideologies, in part, on 
Western blueprints. Although the Japanese have outwardly embraced this change from the 
start, I think that there have always been many underlying mixed emotions towards this 
imposition, becoming the cause of potential unease and disharmony. 
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4.1.2 Militarism and masculinity 
As Japan entered its Taishō period (1912-1926), the military grew and the empire expanded, 
making new ways of promoting gender necessary. Through the ryōsai kenbo ideology, 
women‘s roles as mothers became more prominent than their previously dominant role as 
wife. While all able-bodied men went out to war, there emerged a need for women to produce 
more children for the good of the Empire
78
, not entirely unlike what happened in fascist 
regimes of Germany and Italy. Lise Skov and Brian Moeran point out that Japanese women 
have been important both to the building of Japan‘s nation state and of its economic 
development, but simultaneously had been overlooked or marginalised.
79
 When women‘s 
reproductive roles during the militarism period in the 30s and 40s were promoted, it was the 
first time the Japanese state ―promoted a positive image of women.‖80 The women were used 
to build families, and stabilise and sustain the population growth in times of great need of 
men or soldiers. This was women‘s ticket into proper adulthood or real ―womanliness‖. 
Men‘s ideology, on the other hand, was focused, among other ideals, on the tairiku rōnin 
(continental adventurer) image, which many men began to worship after the Sino-Japanese 
and Russo-Japanese wars, when Japan was consumed with the desire to expand Japan onto 
the Asian continent.
81
 Masculinity came to be defined by military victory, and the ability to 
physically conquer others – an extension of the Western imperialist ideology implemented in 
the Meiji period. A man would only truly become a man if he would serve the state.
82
 
Today, masculine military ideology in Japan is no longer as prevalent, as can be seen in the 
next section, but traces of evidence of it can still be found in the salaryman discourse. Some 
elements in salaryman life strikingly resemble military structure, but it is no longer physical 
ability that commands power and neither is serving the state central to attaining proper 
manhood. 
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4.1.3 After WWII to the present 
After Japan‘s defeat in the Second World War, the United States occupied the country, 
helping revise Japan‘s constitution in 1946, along with many other laws and policies, most 
notably the Civil Code in 1947.
83
 This brought with it a new marriage law and ideology, 
abolishing the old ie system, and legalising freedom of marriage, where mutual consent was a 
prerequisite. The Labour Standards Law was enacted in 1947, enforcing among other things 
that there would be no discriminatory treatment in regards to wages, working hours or 
conditions on the basis of nationality, creed or social status (although not mentioning gender 
specifically).
84
 People began migrating into the cities in great numbers, resulting in the rise of 
the nuclear family. Tessa Carroll believes that the number of nuclear families grew not 
because of newly inspired ideology, but because so many children had been born between 
1925 and 1950 (the period when the state required women to give birth to as many children as 
possible).
85
 While the three-generational households did not by any means disappear on a 
general level, the number of smaller scale families grew. 
The military masculinity ideology as public discourse disintegrated when Japan‘s old military 
force disbanded in 1947 according to the New Constitution written together with the Allied 
Occupation.
86
 Instead of having to carry the burden of military victory, men now had to carry 
the burden of national economic recovery as salarymen. At the very least, this became 
dominant concept and way of thinking, even if at the time it was not representative of how 
most men lived. In essence, one can say that society‘s demands to men were not abolished, 
but merely changed form. The requirements for becoming a ―real man‖ now entailed finding a 
job, getting married and functioning as the main breadwinner for the family.
87
 At the same 
time, fathers‘ authority in the family declined after the New Constitution was written, 
deeming every member of the family as equal, rather than having a patriarchal family head.
88
 
Men have consequently contributed to the rebuilding of the nation and to the nation becoming 
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the world‘s second greatest economy89 but have resulted in very limited interaction between 
fathers and their families. The father figure, being frequently absent at work, came to be an 
idea, rather than physical reality.
90
 While fathers had had far more opportunity to exercise 
their authority in the household before WWII, now all their time and effort was being put into 
their corporate jobs to support their families financially. 
The metaphor of kigyō senshi (corporate warrior) became central, symbolising the men of 
Japan once again ―going to war‖ to counter the economic devastation the Second World War 
had brought upon them.
91
 Salaryman masculinity started to evolve and become mainstream 
―as alternative/competing masculinities such as the soldier and farmer were neutralised as a 
consequence of Japan‘s defeat and subsequent social and economic transformations.‖92 The 
term kigyō senshi correlated to the concept of ryōsai kenbo and the two eventually would 
morph into the modern day concepts of the salaryman and the sengyō shufu (full-time 
housewife), bonding in marriage to serve as the bricks in the nation‘s economic strength.  
The ideology of women‘s roles in the family, on the other hand, remained the same, even 
through the men had shifted from the military to salaryman masculinities. Despite the reality 
of the modern world, and the radical change people underwent after the inception of the 
ryōsai kenbo ideology, women were still expected to maintain the same attitudes and perform 
the same gendered assignments as before, such as housework and child rearing.
93
 New roles 
emerged and continued to diversify, such as the working woman, but rather than merging the 
roles together, strengthening the concept, they became enmeshed, often contradicting each 
other and making each role more difficult to perform. Because Japanese company ideology is 
centralised around the system of lifetime employment, and because women cannot practically 
stay in a company all their life because of child rearing, women would hence always be partly 
excluded from the company and the labour market.
94
 Furthermore, as the economy flourished 
and the salaryman lifestyle became more affluent, the view of women as a sexual commodity, 
either at nightclubs, hostess bars or even as a secretary (―office lady‖), was becoming 
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increasingly more widespread, hindering women‘s progress not by a little, obstructing them 
from getting the respect they deserve. This particular argument is very well described by 
Allison, who conducted research in Tokyo hostess clubs in the late 1980s.
95
 
 
In 1985, the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) was written, ―partly in response to 
pressure from the United Nation during its International Decade for Women (1976-1985)‖.96 
The law enabled a two-track system for employment, calling the first track ippan shoku 
(general employment) and the second track sōgō shoku (career employment).97 This system 
was devised specifically to give women the chance to work on the same equal terms as men. 
Initially, it was intended to put a system into place to hire less qualified women and men in 
the ippan shoku track, and women and men with a higher level of education in the sōgō shoku 
track. However, it backfired, with most women ending up in the ippan shoku track, regardless 
of their education at the convenience of their employers. Meanwhile, number of women who 
continued to work full-time after getting married rose, as a result of the EEOL establishment. 
In 1975, the employment rate of women was 29.5%
98
, growing to become 37.9% in 1995.
99
 
However, there were still inconsistencies in the law, as while there were clauses against 
discrimination in training, welfare, and retirement, there were no restrictions on 
discrimination in recruitment, placement and promotion. This resulted in a revision in 1997, 
including the gender discrimination prohibition clauses mentioned above.
100
 The two-track 
system, however, still prevailed and continued to solidify discrimination between genders, as 
well as between regular and non-regular employees. 
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4.2 Decline and insecurities – the reality of work 
―Only ten years ago, the Japanese family system, along with many others of its management structures, was 
regarded as the reason for Japan‘s economic success. Ten years of recession and exactly the same systems are 
being used to explain Japan‘s economic failure.‖101 
If there ever was a ―golden age‖ for the salaryman, it would have been a couple of decades 
after the Second World War, until the bursting of the ―bubble economy‖ in the early1990s. 
While the first generation to be born after the war was still burdened with the task of getting 
the nation back on its feet, their children were increasingly able to experience the security of 
lifetime employment, and the automatic salary and status increases according to their length 
of service to the company (nenkō jōretsu).102 Specifically, this was more available to men 
working in large companies with more secure economies
103
, but nevertheless it served as a 
general  sense of security. Through Japan‘s steady economic growth, companies developed 
into closed communities offering comprehensive welfare systems in exchange for the 
workers‘ loyalty and hard work, becoming mutually dependent in pursuit of maximum 
efficiency. Instead of hiring workers for specific positions, companies started to employ men 
and women in yearly batches as members of the company (or indeed, community), focusing 
on their general skills and abilities, rather than their individual specialties to ensure mobility 
and adjustment at the companies‘ convenience.  
 
Here, it is important to highlight that even before becoming employed, Japanese people still 
suffer from fierce competition to be admitted to the most attractive high schools and 
universities, finding themselves under pressure to prepare for entrance exams from a young 
childhood age.
104
 Entering the right schools crucial to the future accessibility of schools and 
jobs in the future. Students are recruited even before they graduate university and receive on-
the-job training by the company, in whatever skills are needed for the role
105
, rendering the 
content of their education obsolete, giving school credentials a mere symbolic status.
106
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Sābisu zangyō (a term difficult to translate directly, meaning in essence ‗overtime work 
without payment‘, where the word sābisu indicates offering a service without expecting 
payment) soon became a common practice in most businesses, with as much as 10% of work 
falling into this category.
107
 In the 1980s, a public concern for worker‘s health arose when the 
phenomenon of karoshi (death from overwork) became a central debate in the discourse of 
salarymen. More specifically, it is ―a socio-medical term used particularly in applications for 
workers' compensation, especially in cases of cardio-vascular disease brought on by excessive 
workloads and occupational stress.‖108 This was a phenomenon embodying all problems 
associated with salaryman lifestyle and was first blamed on the individuals‘ poor life choices. 
However, as more and more attention was drawn to it in the 1990s, both through lawsuits and 
through research, the blame shifted to that of the system.
109
 According to Tetsuro Kato, it 
became transparent that ―the Japanese management system [was] protected by government 
policies which [allowed] employers to arbitrarily determine their employee's overtime 
hours‖.110 Rational company strategy developed into spending a little more money to offer 
better salaries and less sābisu zangyō, in order to decrease the lawsuits and improve health 
among workers. However, reduction in recruitment after the prolonged recession in the 1990s 
meant a smaller workforce, which led to more tasks and longer working hours for the 
employees. As a result, abolishing sābisu zangyō entirely was never possible, especially in the 
case of younger recruits. 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, it became clear that the aging population was becoming a 
problem for the country. Japan‘s fertility rate had gone from 2.1 children per female in 1970 
to 1.8 in 1980 and by the 1990s, it had fallen to 1.5.
111
 From the 1970s to the 1990s, the ratio 
of people of a working age (20-64) to people of pension age had decreased from 8.1 to 4.3.
112
 
The government created the ―Gold Plan of 1990‖ to provide services like home help, day-
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care, short-stay community centres and nursing homes to support the rapidly aging 
population.
113
 The ―New Gold Plan‖ was introduced in 1994, which was then followed by 
―Gold Plan 21‖ in 2000 as a result of overwhelming demand. In 1994, the government 
initiated the 10-year programme ―Angel Plan‖ to make it easier for women to both have a 
family and work, as well as to hopefully remove the stigma from working mothers. Some of 
the services to be offered included ―day nurseries, drop-in care for non-working mothers, 
centres to care for sick children, after-school care centres and counselling centres for parents 
with childcare problems‖114. However, the ―Angel Plan‖ failed and did not reach the public as 
intended, again because of the economic downfall in the same period. Companies were 
already worried about their financial prospects and therefore were reluctant to invest more 
money in new governmental plans, when they already had invested so much in the previous 
―Gold Plans‖. The ―New Angel Plan‖ was released in 2000 to help develop a more ―family-
friendly‖ society.115 
 
The bursting of the bubble economy in 1990 seriously ―shook‖ the lifetime employment 
system, as well as the notion that the company is a person‘s primary community. Since then, 
there is a constant ongoing increase in part-time workers and temporary workers, short-term 
contract workers and as a result, the wage structure has started to move towards being based 
on ability and performance, rather than on years of loyal service.
116
 The reputed lifetime 
employment system with its seniority driven wages (nenkō jōretsu) is becoming less and less 
available than it had been before the 1990s. The EEOL has been revised several times, but has 
never included substantial punishment for corporations that do not carry out the laws.
117
 The 
growing ageing population and the drop in population growth is a serious, economic threat to 
Japan but because having so many elderly living in one state is so costly, there is a constant 
need to raise more money. This makes it even more difficult to implement efficient gender 
equality legislations at the present, because there is no economic room or finances available to 
give women better salaries and create better conditions for families.
118
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So far, the legislations and support systems offered to families have not successfully been 
able to support families as intended. Sābisu zangyō is not being questioned, which is a 
phenomenon that makes it particularly difficult to read statistics correctly. Kato established in 
1993 that statistics offered by the Ministry of Labour and Welfare (MoLW) showed that an 
average Japanese worker logged 1,920 hours that year, roughly equal to that of the USA. But 
looking at the statistics provided by the International Labour Organization (ILO), he 
concluded that the statistics from the MoLW did not include sābisu zangyō and that real 
working hours in fact were about 350 hours more than reported.
119
  
I calculated an updated estimate based on the most recent data released by both the ILO and 
the MoLW to see if I could find any such discrepancy myself, though being aware that neither 
release statistics about sābisu zangyō explicitly due to its elusive nature. I added statistics 
about South Korea for comparison. Based on the number of working days in 2009 (248 in 
Japan; 254 in Korea)
120
, minus an estimate of actual vacation days spent in 2009 (8.5 days in 
Japan
121
; 8.5 days in Korea
122
), not divided by gender, in 2009 all employees worked on 
average 7.1 hours/day (1713.5 hours/year) in Japan and 9.1 hours/day (2255.8 hours/year
123
) 
in Korea.
124
 
However, looking at specific data released by ILO relevant to areas of employment of my 
interviewees (wholesale and retail trade, financial intermediation and public administration), 
divided by gender (which is a division not provided by the MoLW), one can see that there is a 
significant difference to be found. The most recent data from ILO is regrettably from as far 
back as 2008, but I believe it still illustrates the point I aim to make. On average, both genders 
worked 8.28 hours a day (41.4 hours/week) in Japan and 7.78 hours a day (38.9 hours/week) 
in Korea.
125
 The discrepancy became even more evident when dividing the statistic between 
genders (though unfortunately, the ILO does not provide this for South Korea). On average, 
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men worked 9.16 hours a day (45.8 hours/week) and women worked 7.16 hours a day (35.8 
hours/week).
126
 
Finally, I would like to add that although salaryman masculinity is considered to be 
hegemonic by most theorists, it is important to keep in mind that there are many different 
masculinity models, both present and emerging in Japan today. As mentioned in the 
introduction, Roberson and Suzuki‘s anthology maps out many different masculinities, which 
all potentially contend the hegemony of the salaryman ideal. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to construct a historical framework for my analysis, 
explaining some of the main events and changes that Japan has gone through in the context of 
gender and masculinity ideology. I will refer to many of these aspects in various parts of my 
thesis. 
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5 Masculinity and work 
This chapter will mainly address the questions and issues related to masculinity ideologies in 
a work context. First, I will present some of my interviewees‘ views that indicate which 
masculine ideologies are currently present or emerging in relation to their role as workers, 
often in opposition to their views on women‘s roles in the same instances. This does not 
exclude the possibility that the same men may feel differently about other aspects of 
masculinity, which I will discuss later in chapters 6, ―Masculinity and family‖, and 
―Masculinity and life purpose‖. I will then discuss these views in light of arguments in the 
works of Dasgupta and Futoshi Taga. The main theories I will apply as a method of argument 
are the concept of hegemonic masculinity and the breadwinner ideal, as well as some gender 
constructionist theories to establish that salaryman masculinity is indeed a gendered 
construct. To further contextualise it, I will also apply gender discrepancy theory. Finally, I 
will compare my findings to that of Hidaka‘s in the same instances to unveil whether any 
changes in attitudes can be found over time. 
5.1 Personal narratives 
Hayato 
Hayato argued that it is not justifiable economically to have a female breadwinner; that he felt 
that without a male breadwinner, the chances of the family going bankrupt are much higher. 
He did, however, think that it is rationally better for women to be working alongside men, as 
it brings better economical conditions to the household, because it is difficult to depend solely 
on the husband‘s salary to support a whole family. It seems that ideally, he highly respects 
women – especially those who went to highly regarded universities with good results and 
have bright futures. He thinks it absurd that women would go to a highly ranked university, 
get good grades, then work for a few years, get married and end up never using their potential. 
For women to quit their jobs is a waste. But he blames it not only on the companies, but Japan 
in general for the lack of good systems, kindergartens, and support establishments for women 
to enable them to work on equal terms with men. 
When talking about gender equality at work, Hayato was annoyed that there was practically 
no such thing in his work place. Priding himself on his rationality, he deduced the reason to 
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mainly be the large gender wage-gap between women and men, which in 2008 was measured 
to women‘s earnings in full-time employment on average as 69.3% of men‘s earnings.127 In 
comparison, the gender wage gap is measured to be 61.2% in Korea and 91.4% in Norway. 
When it comes to paternity leave, his opinion is that more men should really take the chance 
of taking paternity leave, but it becomes a problem when the company won‘t let you because 
they don‘t have the support system available. He is unhappy with the social stigma 
surrounding it, preferring that it should become a societal norm instead. 
Hayato does not, however, believe that a better salary for women will automatically result in 
more working women. In his experience, he believes that the fact is many women see true 
merit in the decision to be a housewife, and that they may not have to work as hard as they 
would in an office environment. Hayato showed himself to be inclined towards thinking that 
it is a woman‘s choice to stay at home, rather than being forced by circumstance. He excused 
himself for his view, saying this might be an old-fashioned Japanese way of being and 
thinking. Furthermore, it is not only women‘s choice which frustrates him. He showed 
resentment for the way his company treats women in his eyes, such as letting them leave 
whenever they want every day, allowing a short vacation every month while the men are 
denied any form of freedom. This all seems greatly unfair in his eyes. To him, it is 
inexplicable why women are not treated the same as the men in his company – he would 
prefer total equality over anything else. 
Shinji 
Shinji told me he feels that the husband or father does not necessarily have to be the main or 
only provider from a gendered perspective. He felt that he and his future wife should be equal 
members of the family (equal partners, rather than ―husband‖ and ―wife‖) and he was 
conflicted in that seeing that the system today cannot afford to provide enough support for 
dual-earner households. As long as the system in place remains, he thinks that it would place 
too much of a strain on the household if his wife and him were both to come home late every 
night, and be unable to take off time freely and unrestricted. Shinji‘s concern did not so much 
revolve around the opportunities for women, but around the children‘s feelings and wellbeing. 
He implied that if the mother of the household was to enter employment, she should work on 
the same terms as men in dual-earner households, not work part-time or only for a contract 
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period which makes salaryman masculinity normative, applying it to women as well as men if 
women were to choose such a career path. 
Keitarō 
Keitarō said he thought his married life could be much smoother, if only he could spend only 
a little bit more time at home. However, Keitarō still feels he is in an unchangeable situation, 
in which the priority is to work as hard as he can while he‘s still young, and has the energy. In 
practical terms, he believes that there is more merit for him to invest in work life rather than 
home life, probably because at some point, his physical power and brain power will diminish 
as he gets older, meaning he will not be able to work as effectively later. Most likely, I 
believe he‘s investing in the future this way, so that later, he and his wife will be able to have 
the security of having saved as much money and resources as they can, and at that point, be 
able to turn to working on their relationship. 
Keitarō was conflicted in accepting and understanding female employment on equal terms 
with men, at the same time as not being able to see a real solution to an effective upkeep of a 
household without a housewife at the house. At his job, there are many tenacious, strong-
willed career women and his mother has always worked full-time, just like his father, which 
he says has made him accustomed to women pursuing professional careers but he also says 
that he cannot see the same happening in his own future family. 
Seiichi 
Seiichi was perhaps one of my most complex interviewees, in that he was in a very special 
position at the time of the interview and has today changed his professions completely. When 
I interviewed him, he had just started his leave of absence due to depression caused by the 
environment at his work and was simply racked with conflict and self-doubt about everything 
related to being a salaryman. At the beginning of the interview, he was careful and adhered to 
the norms expected of salarymen when describing his situation, but as our interview went on, 
he became more and more unrestrained and revealed a more liberal, radical side. Seiichi 
became very direct about expressing his dislike for the symbols of the salaryman: the suit and 
tie, the greeting ceremony on the 1
st
 of April when men typically begin their career, and the 
phrase, shakaijin ni naru (becoming a member of society)
128
. He was not the only one to have 
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expressed a discomfort around these symbols – all respondents present at this group interview 
confessed to feeling a certain heaviness merely thinking about these concepts. The suit and 
the tie as symbols are almost completely dominated by the connotation to going to work as a 
salaryman. 
5.2 Discussion 
Breadwinning as the hegemonic masculinity ideal 
Dasgupta argues that in addition to all the expectations and benefits of being a salaryman, an 
additional expectation arises from being the main provider or breadwinner for their families. 
He calls it ―heterosexual patriarchal family ideology‖.129 Salarymen are what drives the nation 
of Japan today. They are the main taxpayers and supporters of the state and in order for the 
state and economy to continue to flourish and be maintained, the hegemony of salaryman 
masculinity needs to prevail.
130
 This is not unlike the situation in South Korea, where men‘s 
roles as breadwinners are perhaps even stronger and more prominent than they are in Japan.
131
 
Both the construction of saellôrimaen and the construction of women as dependent 
housewives encourage men to view their role as financial providers as the most crucial family 
responsibility. This makes the men believe that should they fail to provide for their families, 
they will lose their masculinity.
132
 
The way I see it, it is not a masculine patriarchy mainly created and reproduced by men to 
subdue women, but a masculinity constantly reproduced and reconstructed by the state out of 
necessity, which as a result, means that the nation is capable of surviving through crucial 
points in history and national crises (such as the Meiji restoration, WWII, numerous natural 
disasters and financial crises, as referred to earlier in chapter 4, ―Masculinity through 
history‖). It is not as simple to just look upon the roles of women in Japan and deem their 
reality suppressed as is, because their roles have until now been clearly defined, which has 
enabled society to function well in a multitude of aspects – until a certain point. Now, new, 
more difficult times and difficult economic situations have arisen over the last few decades, 
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and the state is in a dire need of a new strategy. Women must be included into formal 
employment and work life on equal terms with men in order to rebuild and raise the nation 
again, so that the birth rate doesn‘t fall even lower. 
Hayato‘s justification his ideal breadwinner being male, not female, was chiefly economic. It 
was clear that he thinks highly of women, and he also said that he blames society for not 
providing better support systems to enable a gender diversity at work. He also pointed to the 
gender wage gap as one reason why women do not work similarly long hours in the office as 
men most of the time. This attitude could indicate that if women accept this gender pay gap 
and lack of support as a reality, she helps perpetuate the gendered construct of women as 
created by the state and its institutions. In Hayato‘s opinion, however, simply offering a 
higher salary to women will not truly change anything in practical terms. He considers it 
preferable to have complete gender equality at work, but in his experience, women often 
choose to stay at home or work part-time instead of arguing their cause. Shinji was roughly of 
the same opinion as Hayato and similarly believed that there was no need for this gender 
inequality at work. Shinji also acknowledged the problem of the lack of state support for 
working women. 
Awareness of gender inequality is a crucial factor in encouraging change and both Hayato and 
Shinji demonstrated themselves to be acutely aware. For them, it would seem that they feel 
society around them is slow to develop by itself, but they personally do not conform 
completely to the gender ideologies constructed by it. If given the chance by the institutions 
or the state, they said they would support the cause immediately. If this sort of thinking was, 
in theory, to become widespread, the potential for change would certainly be significant. 
Keitarō, on the other hand, is clearly in favour of the male breadwinner ideal. Even if it would 
result in the improvement of his married life, giving him more time at home, it would still be 
a priority for him to focus on work while he has the energy. It could be argued that he feels 
trapped inside by what society has to offer to him and perhaps feels that the only way to deal 
with this is to deny the problem at hand, and meanwhile do the best he can – to work as hard 
as possible, while his wife supports him at home. From our conversation, I gathered that 
Keitarō generally approves of the reality of working life in Japanese society, which demands 
full commitment and excessive overtime work from working males. This in turn pressures 
wives to stay at home and do household chores, forcing them to submit to the ideology of the 
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male breadwinner, and therefore justifying the Japanese way of organising working life, 
which is ridden with gender discrimination. 
Symbolism and discrepancy 
Seiichi talked of the symbolism connected to salaryman masculinity, and the expectations 
entrenched within it. When the idea of putting on a suit was brought up, the interviewees 
around the table reacted strongly, saying it gave them an automatic association with stress and 
heavy shoulders. The 1
st
 of April and the phrase shakaijin ni naru are linked together in a 
complicated net of ―becoming an adult‖ for young men and women. Although, for women, it 
is worth noting that the concept of entering adulthood is somewhat delayed, because there is 
still a widespread belief that women only become ―real women‖ after they get married. Men 
do not really become a part of adult society until you have started your job on the 1
st
 of April, 
but starting a job in this way also is inextricably linked up with the concept of abandoning 
your childhood and starting your new path. This path is already laid out for you, and is the 
one you follow until retirement (ideally). 
The transition between child, adolescent and adult is not smooth and gradual, at least not as is 
typical in a Western context. It is abrupt, sudden and unstoppable. Emotions are running high 
around graduation from university because everyone knows they are leaving behind 
something they can never retain. Putting such strong emotions into a symbol, such as a suit 
and a tie, can give it deeply entrenched meaning. All expectations as both members of society 
and as men become concentrated in this outfit they are required to wear as proper conduct. 
This, I would suggest, is another indication of salaryman masculinity being a clear gendered 
construct, complete with normative symbols of what a salaryman should be like and how he 
should behave. 
Taga argues that there has been a crisis of gender identity for men, because the traditional 
hegemonic salaryman masculinity ideal is starting to decline in legitimacy.
133
 He further 
argues that although salaryman ideology has been a very powerful symbol to the 
masculinities of Japan, the recent economic difficulties and demographic challenges have 
―called into question the necessity of male breadwinning and domination over women.‖134 
Dasgupta says that Japanese men cannot or do not measure up to the hegemonic masculinity 
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ideal.
135
 Masculinity becomes a performance – a role to be played. The role of salarymen is 
highly intricate and what fulfilling that role entails has been worked out to the smallest detail. 
It is not only about what a salaryman must bring to the table or what it truly means to be a 
breadwinner, but also entails how to dress, how to talk, how to behave, what to eat, drink and 
even whether to smoke or not. Seiichi became an excellent example of the impact this role can 
have and importantly, how it is counterintuitive to how men genuinely feel. The immense 
symbolism in the suit and the tie represents everything about the role of salarymen. In order 
to become an adult – shakaijin ni naru – and be deemed as a worthy citizen, a salaryman 
needs to conform to every ideal hiding behind the suit symbol. The suit becomes a costume of 
the role and by putting it on, a man becomes one with the hegemonic ideal of salaryman 
masculinity. But if what being a salaryman represents does not match what the man inside the 
suit personally stands for, he will be reprimanded by society and his social circle (often work, 
family and neighbourhood). This is in accordance with gender discrepancy theory, which 
postulates that when men are reprimanded for not fitting into the generally accepted ideal, 
they will exaggerate their masculinity to conform to said ideal. Consequently, this may play a 
part in why the hegemonic ideals of masculinity are often being perpetuated. However, as 
illustrated by Seiichi‘s case, some men break out of the stereotypes by severing the ties with 
what sparked their insecurities and as Seiichi did, quit their jobs and move on to a wholly 
different profession. It is a form of resistance, albeit a passive one. 
Rapid movement towards the acceptance of gender equality at work 
In Hidaka‘s results, there were some differences between the working ideals of men who were 
aged between 60 and 80, men aged between 40 to 59, and the men who were aged 20 to 39. 
The common opinion of the older group was that men as the sole breadwinner was an 
incontestable social rule.
136
 In the third, youngest group, the majority supported the idea of 
women working professionally, but many of them were still married to full-time housewives. 
Hidaka also found that across all of her groups, there was little difference when it came to 
attitudes to what kind of work women were suited for.
137
 Whereas the older participants had 
had little to no interaction with female workers overall, and therefore expressed discomfort in 
even imagining women working alongside them, participants in the group aged 40 to 59 
generally acknowledged the official state promotion of gender equality, but did not genuinely 
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approve of women working in their areas of business. The men in the youngest group 
revealed that they were fine with women working full-time, but still expected women to assist 
them, rather work equally with them. All of the participants were under the assumption that 
women would always prioritise family over work, leaving work for a period of time or even 
permanently, causing trouble for the company as a result. 
In this regard, many of my interviewees were far more accepting of the idea that women 
should work in the same manner as themselves. Hayato explicitly told me that he yearned for 
a gender-equal workplace, it being preferable to the current situation. Shinji also said that if a 
woman decides to work full-time, she should work the same amount, under the same pressure 
that men do. Out of my other interviewees not quoted above, or quoted on different subjects, 
Yoshio, Ryōta, Seiichi, Shigeo, Yōji, Shūji and Tōru all felt more or less the same way, 
making it a majority in my selection of participants. Those more inclined towards the male 
breadwinner ideal were Nobuhiko, Keitarō and Takurō. All of my participants understood the 
importance of women working, but the latter three felt that women should eventually quit 
their jobs to help raise the family as a housewife, reminiscent of Hidaka‘s second age group 
(40 to 59).  
It is possible to deduce from these results that there is a clear indication of a shift in opinion, 
or a change in viewpoint on gender equality, and therefore, a change on the attitude held by 
men towards the hegemonic salaryman masculinity ideal in the context of work. My 
participants were all under the age of 30, which might indicate that change is occurring rather 
rapidly in the younger age groups. 
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6 Masculinity and family 
In this chapter, I will place emphasis on questions concerning masculinity ideologies in 
relation to family life. As in chapter 5, ―Masculinity and work‖, I will first present a range of 
my interviewees‘ views on masculinity, which I feel best represent current and emerging 
attitudes towards it within a family context. I will then analyse the results, using the articles of 
Ishii-Kuntz, as well as the works of Annalisa Murgia and Barbara Poggio, and Allison. As 
before, social constructionist theories will be invaluable here. To best illustrate any reason for 
why there is a discrepancy in desire for gender equality in the home and in the family by 
using gender boundary theory, as well as Ishii-Kuntz‘ theory of mothers‘ involvement in the 
reinforcement of the breadwinner ideal. Finally, I will once more employ Hidaka‘s research to 
compare against and see if there are any changes in attitudes to be found across generations. 
6.1 Personal narratives 
Nobuhiko 
In literature focusing on Japanese masculinity, the word daikokubashira (the pillar of the 
household) is often repeated. Some call it ―the depiction of Japanese masculinity‖138, and 
some call it an ―unshakable ideological status in Japan‖139. Like a pillar supports the roof of a 
house, a true man supports his family unyieldingly, but if his support was to be taken away 
from them, the family would be crushed. Nobuhiko told me that to him, the meaning of the 
word ―husband‖ was someone central and strong. In his words, he said that a husband is ―like 
the centre pillar of the family‖. When asked how he grew up, he told me that his father has 
always been self-employed and never worked like other salarymen. His mother also continues 
to be a full-time housewife. In other words, while his father is not a regular salaryman, he still 
is the main provider of the family. 
Nobuhiko is an only child who got a lot of attention from his parents growing up, and I 
believe that he received a thorough social education which made a strong impact on him. He 
does not, however, think that women should work after they have given birth. He told me that 
he thinks mothers are instrumental in raising a child. From this, I can only deduce that he 
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must believe that fathers are not as important for the same task, or perhaps, that fathers‘ role 
in the family may even have nothing to do with the act of raising a child. Nobuhiko implies 
that it would be a positive development if both women and men can work on equal terms, but 
that in the end, when it comes to raising children, the mother is more important. 
I wondered why he felt this way, and everything pointed to his upbringing. When we 
discussed the idea of children going to kindergarten, socialising with other children of a 
similar age, Nobuhiko seemed to have a very negative image of it. He said it must be lonely 
and sad for the children; because his mother took very good care of him, he now cannot 
imagine anything else. He added that if possible, all children should spend most of their time 
with their mothers. Assuming that both parents are working and the child is going to 
kindergarten, both parents will come home late, making the children wait a long time for 
parental interaction, instead of only a single parent being away for most of the week. The only 
good point about the existence of kindergartens, to him, is that parents might feel more free to 
do as they wish (though not taking into account that working late hours every night might also 
be considered less free by some). Ultimately though, Nobuhiko implies that sending children 
off to kindergarten simply for the wish of feeling free is a lazy and selfish thing to do. 
Hayato 
Hayato said that in his opinions, husbands and fathers are supposed to be ―the spine of the 
family‖. However, his views were much more firmly rooted in fathers‘ roles as economic 
necessity to the family; a much less ideological view than Nobuhiko. He felt that inside the 
family, all organisational aspects can be handled with from a nearly gender equal perspective, 
but ultimately that economic reasoning will always stop this from becoming a reality.  As a 
result, because of the necessity of the father being the breadwinner, rather than the mother, the 
father consequently can and will direct and judge all family development. 
Hayato told me that his father was strict and scared him a lot when he was a child; more so, in 
fact, than the police. His father would work very hard every weekday, sometimes as late as 3 
am. They would never spend time together, except on the weekends, and his father had a lot 
of strict and strange rules in the house. Hayato‘s father would sometimes hit him or scream at 
him loudly, and always punish him for being rebellious. But when Hayato started going to 
high school and developed his own independent opinions, his father became lenient and let 
him choose things more freely. Hayato‘s father did not object to girlfriends, or even of him 
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dying his hair (although he drew the line at piercings, Hayato said). I wondered whether this 
was a contradictory upbringing, where he first was taught that fathers are supposed to be firm 
and strict, then later, witnessing a complete change in behaviour. But the more we discussed 
his upbringing, the more sure he became that he wanted to raise his children the same way. 
He jokingly called himself an ―old Japanese guy‖, implying that he had old fashioned ways of 
thinking. He did not want me to think that he approved of domestic violence because we had 
just discussed his father exercising just that in his childhood, but he still thinks that 
upbringing should be quite strict for a child to be able to develop their own opinions in later 
years. 
Shinji 
Shinji told me that he was very happy about his upbringing. His mother is a full-time 
housewife and his father is a regular salaryman. He thinks that his upbringing was excellent 
compared to some people around him and that he would like to provide the same security and 
happiness to his own future children. He admires his parents, and hopes in the future that his 
children will admire him in the same way. In Shinji‘s view, it would be better to be raised by 
your own parents than by someone unrelated. However, he added that it was not truly 
essential to have a parent at home at all times, as long as there is at least one parent who can 
be relied on to be there at some point during the day. In the end, though, he said that having 
one stay-at-home parent would be a great deal more preferable to both parents working full-
time, spending little time with their children as a result. 
Shinji explained that there is a paternity leave system in place in his company, but that to even 
think such a thing brings forth social stigmatisation. He says that if he were to take paternity 
leave, he would probably be ―frozen out‖ (of what I assume is the social group at work). To 
him, this is Japanese thinking as a whole, not just this company‘s and not just his own. He 
nearly apologised for the ―strange ways of Japan‖, trying to legitimise that it is not his own 
personal emotions which lead to him feeling this way, but that he is trapped in a societal cage 
where paternity leave is not yet commonplace. To him, if there is a choice between women 
and men having to take parental leave, it will in the end be the woman. He thinks that the 
paternity leave system exists only to show people that parental leave is not limited to women, 
even if everyone thinks so. 
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Yoshio 
Yoshio has a very distant relationship with his father. His father was rarely around and 
Yoshio feels nothing for him. One can reasonably assume that his father‘s absence may well 
be a factor into his wish to raise his own children as much as he can on his own. He does not 
seem particularly emotionally pained by his upbringing, just explaining the logical result of it 
in a straightforward way. Nevertheless, his way of looking at raising children and family life 
differs radically from his own upbringing. 
When Yoshio gets married, he says that both him and his partner will continue working full-
time. If there aren‘t any children involved, it doesn‘t matter to him what couples do and how 
they do it. If they do have children, however, they will both have to seriously consider how 
they feel about who should stay home or if they should at all. He does not intend to instruct 
his wife to stay home if she doesn‘t want to. If she wishes to take maternity leave, that‘s fine 
too, he says. However, if she were to ask Yoshio to take paternity leave so she could continue 
at work,  he says that he will accept this as a possibility. He has no definite plan to follow, or 
idea of how things have to be in the future. He is open either way (or even any way) and 
acknowledges that there can be many ways to solve such an issue. Most intriguingly, he 
thinks that the man staying at home with children as a man is a valid option. Still, it seems 
that there must still be someone at home, in order to provide childcare, be it one of the 
parents, grandparents, or themselves. 
Yoshio said that there have been several instances of men taking paternity leave in his 
company, taking off six whole months before, which is yet another indicator that his company 
is more liberal than others‘. However, he mentioned the negative impact that this can have on 
the atmosphere in the company, and how taking paternity leave can create some distance or 
uneasiness from both the side of the father and his co-workers. In Yoshio‘s opinion, this is 
more based on the practical fact that it may be difficult to pick up the workload exactly the 
way it was left, moreso than because taking paternity leave is fairly unacceptable, socially. He 
made an interesting point, saying that in his view, it would be better to just come home earlier 
each day by working harder and more efficiently, instead of stopping work for a period 
altogether. Yoshio thinks that this would be a far more balanced method for both keeping the 
progress at work and spending sufficient time with his family. This set him apart from other 
interviewees, as he said that he sees an alternative to both working as always and taking long-
term paternity leave. Using this method of working harder, he thinks it is a realistic 
54 
 
expectation to reduce working hours. He assured me that he will be able to do this when he 
has children because his company is so flexible.  
Keitarō 
Keitarō was persistent in that a husband stands central in a family and that the man is the main 
breadwinner, working for the whole family, for both husband and wife. What is perhaps most 
interesting about Keitarō, is that both his parents work very much on equal terms and have 
done so all his life. Even though his own mother works just as hard as his father, he seems 
considerably uninfluenced by this. No matter what, he considered his father to be more 
central, both economically and socially, than his mother. When we delved a little deeper into 
his upbringing, it turned out that he had a free and unrestrained childhood, with little 
influence from his parents either way. 
When asked why there is a welfare system in the first place if no one is actually utilising it, 
Keitarō said that its purpose was not so that everyone will use it mechanically to its full 
extent, but more functioning as a safety net – so that if ever something serious happens to 
anyone, there will be a way out. If the issue is only something comparatively small, such as 
having a cold, his opinion is that it is completely fine for people to take it out of their paid 
vacation. However, if something serious happens, such as a family emergency, it is acceptable 
to take a form of welfare leave. He explained that there is a maternity leave scheme in his 
company, but that it seriously restricts women‘s ability to return to their previous position in 
the company. On paper, or ―on the surface‖, as he puts it, working mothers are essentially 
doing the same thing as before, but realistically, they have to go home earlier every day and 
just aren‘t as restricted by management as they used to be, because taking care of children 
takes time and energy and will end up being the main priority. 
Paternity leave is such an alien concept to Keitarō that he hasn‘t even considered whether they 
have a system for it at his job. He explains that in his company, it goes for both men and 
women that they all put their job ahead of their private life and family-life must bear the 
brunt. Keitarō did not mention if these women have families and if their husbands are 
working as well. He maintained that he would not take paternity leave at all, perhaps only the 
same day children are born. He summed it up by saying that asking for a whole period of time 
off from work ―just‖ to raise a child is a difficult thing. 
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Seiichi 
Seiichi said that for him, being a boyfriend and being a husband are basically the same, 
adding however that perhaps something changes when you become a father. He believes that 
it‘s positive for both women and men to work on equal footing, and that when he has 
children, he says he will without a doubt take paternity leave. He thinks that both women and 
men should take parental leave, because there should be no difference between men and 
women in this regard. Seiichi wants his future wife to work full-time if it‘s possible 
(depending on her world views or opportunities to work and so on). He continued, adding that 
he felt overprotected growing up and that he wants to raise his children in an environment 
radically different from his own. 
Takurō 
Takurō‘s father has always worked in a company and his mother is a full-time housewife. His 
father was a tanshin fūnin (business bachelor)140 in Takurō‘s childhood, being home for six 
months, then away for six months. He loved to work and was a domineering character in the 
family. He would be very cold to his son, but Takurō explains this as being ―Japanese culture‖ 
for fathers to act in such a way. His father would never say much around the house, leaving 
everything to mother, only to intervene when something important was happening. 
Takurō believes that the roles of mothers and fathers are very different. He stressed that he 
does not yet know how his own future will become and that it is only an assumption, but it is 
clear that he already sits with defined opinions on family and parenthood. He is not flexible 
on the tradition of the man being the main breadwinner of the family, feeling that his future 
wife should only work if they do not have enough income for survival.
141
 Takurō was unsure 
if this inflexibility was developed during his upbringing. While he didn‘t deny the possibility, 
he concluded that in the end, regardless of the idea‘s origin, this was his genuine attitude. He 
has already decided that he would like the mother to raise his child, not a third party.  
It was noteworthy that even though he told me that his father would rarely spend time in the 
house and leave everything to his mother, his father was still a dominant figure in the 
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household. His mother being physically present has not shaken the belief or conviction that a 
father is the centre of the family. In other words, physical presence was not in Takurō‘s case, 
a determining factor to the presence of the idea about a father. The question then remains of 
how these ideas manage to be so paramount in the minds of people like Takurō. 
Shigeo 
For Shigeo, a father is someone who has great influence over a child, which he views as a 
large responsibility to have. He said he did not yet know if he will spend more time with his 
future children than his father did with him, but it seems he was at least determined to spend 
more quality time at home whenever possible. Because of this great influence a father holds 
over a child, in Shigeo‘s mind, they should spend as much time as they can with their 
children. In other words, existing mainly as a psychological presence would not be suffice for 
Shigeo‘s children – he would now require a father to be present on all accounts.  
Yet when discussing the practical act of raising a child, he became momentarily conflicted. At 
first, Shigeo automatically assumed that his girlfriend would continue to work as she was 
doing at the time of the interview, even after potentially getting married. But when he was 
asked what would happen if a child was born, he said he didn‘t know. Shigeo was certain he 
wouldn‘t quit his job or take a break ―just‖ because of a child, but expressed uncertainty 
towards whether his girlfriend (or wife) would do the same. In the end, he said it would be a 
decision to be made when the situation arose, as it was too difficult to make definitive 
decisions on something so important in such intangible, abstract terms. 
Yōji 
Yōji has a firm belief that women, and especially his future wife, should work full-time, like 
him. Therefore, his future family will be different than the one he grew up on, and as a 
consequence, not comparable. He was conflicted, because he felt that women should have the 
freedom to do whatever they want, but also felt there was an element of selfishness involved 
in wanting to continue working full-time, instead of raising children (for the women, not the 
men). He remained convinced that there are no difficulties for women in regaining their 
footing on the employment ladder, after returning from maternity leave, but he also ignored 
the fact that having children irrevocably changes your life, which to me points to a certain 
naivety he has towards child-rearing. 
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There is no paternity leave at Yōji‘s company. He said that there was someone who asked for 
it, and took it, but he received a pay cut and went down the employment ladder again when he 
returned. Yōji legitimised this by saying that every year, each worker must sign a new 
contract based on last year‘s results, and they can judge that the employee who took paternity 
leave had poor results due to his absence. Yōji thinks that if only people put more effort in 
after returning from parental leave, they wouldn‘t have such a problem regaining their footing 
on the employment ladder, but he failed to acknowledge that having children requires more 
time and effort than just being single or childless. When we reminded Yōji that parents have 
to pick up children at kindergarten and generally spend time with them, he became unsure, 
saying that he doesn‘t yet know how that will work out. In other words, he hasn‘t honestly 
thought about people as different when they have children before. 
Shūji 
 
Shūji‘s parents both have full-time professional jobs and have worked hard all his life. He 
spent most of his childhood time in kindergarten and was raised by his grandparents. Today, 
he supports the idea of women and men both working on equal ground and sees no problem in 
sending children off to kindergarten in the daytime, but because he was raised by his 
grandparents, he now cannot imagine a life without someone always being there to help. In 
other words, even if he supports the idea of women working, it does not change the system 
per se – someone still needs to be at home to help them out. He told me that both his own and 
his girlfriend‘s parents are all willing to help them out in the future, since his girlfriend is 
planning on working professionally all her life. He cannot imagine how the future will be if 
they didn‘t have their parents‘ support. 
Shūji‘s company doesn‘t offer paternity leave. He would otherwise have planned to take it 
himself. However, because he is the union leader in the Hiroshima branch, he has recently 
proposed to have paternity leave to management and thinks that this might be implemented in 
the near future. He supposed that leave will be about two weeks long, adding that it may be 
too short in the early stages, but he doubts the company will allow it to run longer than that. 
Company policy, he thinks, is if someone takes leave for two or three months, it is unlikely 
that they will be able to perform as well at their job as before. Shūji says that if given the 
chance, he would take three, four or even five months off. He considers habit as the primary 
cause of the lack of paternity leave available in Japanese companies generally. He said that 
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because companies are worried about their workers‘ performance, they don‘t want to grant a 
long-term leave for anything. Shūji was sure that he would be able to prove that he can 
perform just as well as before after long-term leave, but he is certain that management 
wouldn‘t meet him half-way. 
 
Tōru 
Of all my interviewees, the most ambivalent was perhaps Tōru. It was clear that he had not 
thought deeply about having children or family before. This was such a foreign concept to 
him that he had to concentrate hard to truly figure out what his opinion was, half-way through 
our conversation. He eventually said he couldn‘t see anything particularly negative in women 
working just as long and demanding hours as men, but since he had not considered what it 
would mean to have children, he did not know much about maternity or paternity leave, for 
instance. He felt that there did exist a problem in society that prevented women from pursuing 
professional careers while having a family at the same time, but conversely, he did not think it 
would be necessary for him to take paternity leave if he could only reduce overtime work and 
stop working in the weekends.  
Tōru mentioned that economic incentives were important reasons why many couples choose 
to live in a dual-earning household, but he said that there was an unfair discrepancy in the 
workplace between men and women. Specifically, he referred to maternity leave, and how 
after returning to work after having a child, a woman may lose her previous position in a 
company. He was quite used to the idea of the ―career woman‖, as there were many of them 
both at his first and at his current job, and he did not think they had a difficult time, until they 
had children. 
6.2 Discussion 
Reinforcing and perpetuating gender stereotypes 
 
Murgia and Poggio conducted a study of attitudes towards paternity leave in Italy and many 
of the elements were similar to some of what I found in my own results. Their research had 
more ground in the opinions of organisation management, as well as the workers themselves. 
They argue that stories of men who successfully managed to take paternity leave and return to 
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work could serve as a spark to ―induce change in people and workplace cultures‖142, but that 
these voices will be seen as threats and thus silenced. When management does not wish to 
change the organisation, it won‘t. In order to do that, it needs to see that there is something in 
it to benefit the company. In this study, management often saw requests for paternity leave as 
signs of disloyalty to the organisation, because the workers are supposed to be completely 
available to the employer at all times. In other words, here the managers actively impose the 
norms of hegemonic masculinity on the workers to dominate them. 
Nobuhiko stood by the ideal of daikokubashira, clearly influenced by his own upbringing. 
Mothers, to him, are the ones who are supposed to raise the children – not fathers. Similarly, 
Nobuhiko did not believe in kindergartens as an institution. He said that they were only there 
to provide a safety net for people who are unable to lead a ―normal‖ life, rather than to 
provide parents with a diverse range of options. Hayato also believed in the ideal of 
daikokubashira, albeit more focused on the economic, rather than ideological, aspects of it.  
 
Shinji and Keitarō were both more or less of the same opinion: where Shinji believes that 
welfare systems in companies are only there for ―show‖, Keitarō thinks that welfare systems 
are only there to offer help in the most severe cases, rather than for exploitation by 
opportunists. Shinji however expressed a wish to have a more solid family environment where 
he could spend time with both his wife and future children, yet felt obstructed by his work to 
achieve this. Shigeo, on the other hand, has found himself in a position where he dearly 
wishes to be able to create a warm father-child relationship to his future children, but at the 
same time saw no merit in actually taking time off from work to raise them, implying just like 
Keitarō, that taking leave ―just‖ to raise children was not realistic. 
 
In Japan, according to the Childcare Leave Law, which was put into effect in April 1992, 
workers are allowed to take parental leave until the child turns one. It can be either father or 
mother, or a division, and employers cannot legally refuse. Employers are not obliged to pay 
wages, but there are some clauses involving insurance.
143
 Both men and women who are 
raising a child have the right for reduced overtime up to three years.
144
 Moreover, there are 
public day-care centres and kindergartens, both governmental and affiliated with the 
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company, to assist workers with children in their everyday life, but Glenda Roberts believes 
that the problems lies in the fact that there are simply too few of these child care institutions 
to meet the demands of a changing lifestyle of women
145
 (and, arguably, men). Kazuo Sugeno 
and Yasuo Suwa say that because the Japanese company ideology is centralised around the 
idea of life-long employment (even though it is not, and has ever been, in fact statistically 
common as pointed out in chapter 4, ―Masculinity through history‖), and assuming that 
women cannot stay at work all their life because of child rearing, women will thus be 
excluded from the company or the labour market community and become marginalised.
146
 
Even though there is strong evidence towards women‘s dedication to work, employers still 
view the need for maternity leave (to give birth and raise children) as a conscious choice to be 
less dedicated than men. This is largely the companies‘ justification for employing women in 
the ippan, rather than sōgō category.147 Men, on the other hand have to bear the burden of 
work that is not handed out to women, instead of being offered to opportunity to share it. 
Murgia and Poggio point out that though the men who need paternity leave are victims of the 
system, they maintain and reproduce the system and the hegemonic masculinity by not 
challenging it.
148
  
 
Neither of the interviewees mentioned above truly believed in the system of their companies. 
Some of them did not believe in the necessity of paternity leave even though they believed in 
gender equality, in the context of work and labour. Others felt the need to spend more time 
with their children, but did not see how it could be a realistic choice to take paternity leave to 
achieve this goal. Therefore, it can be argued that in a sense, all of my interviewees are 
maintaining the hegemonic masculinity ideal in its current state by complying with company 
policy. 
 
“Internally modern, externally traditional” 
When Japan entered its modern era, the previous patriarchal tradition was reformulated, both 
on the basis of the Confucian legacy and under the influence of the contemporary European 
capitalist ideologies of gender. Ishii-Kuntz describes the contemporary Japanese family as 
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―externally modern but internally traditional‖.149 On the outside, everyone is supposed to 
follow the adopted strategies and traditions from the West, but is ―lagging behind‖ in cultural, 
internal foundation. In that regard, Japan is not unique, and closely resembles the situation in 
South Korea. However, the Confucian legacy is far more prominent in South Korea than it is 
in Japan and the patriarchy there is in consequence even stronger.
150
 At the same, confusion 
of how to adhere to the gendered constructs imposed by the state arises out of having to 
contribute to the countries‘ rapid economic development. The idea of the ―corporate warrior‖ 
(kigyō senshi) remains, but state-imposed desire for technological advancement and economic 
growth is said to have contributed to the lack of substance in contemporary society itself.
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Not genuinely relating to it, conduct, behaviour and ways of thought are often imitated, rather 
than integrated. Such a situation is naturally a breeding ground for cultural and personal 
discrepancies in though, and as a result, for inner turmoil. 
Workers have legal rights, but most likely in most cases they remain unaware of how many 
rights they have, and when they apply. Instead, they continue working, coping with their own 
struggles and realities quietly, when away from the company. The companies, on the other 
hand, work to ensure an acceptable form of overexploitation of their workers, investing in 
strategic socialisation, veiling it with the pretence of a fully-functioning welfare system. 
Wrongly believing that the mere gesture of offering support is all the workers need to feel 
satisfied, the companies ignore the deeper psychological aspects of social stigmatisation at the 
work place and practical aspects such as ensuring professional stability. If social, as well as 
financial, stability is not fully offered, such oversimplified tools of welfare will remain 
unused, or used only in part of their intent. 
This view in particular puts the responsibility to construct and reproduce the ideas of gender 
and their roles in diminishing the importance of men‘s participation in the home first and 
foremost on the institutions themselves. But individuals too must play a part in the 
reproduction of gender. Once the differences between men and women have been established, 
these constructed ideals are used to reinforce the ―essentialness‖ of gender and its roles in 
society. This is what is offered to men and women from society and the state, but also comes 
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with the responsibility of having to choose how to cope such an offer. By using what is 
offered to them as intended, the actors reinforce the gender stereotypes integrated in the 
opportunities presented. Men are doing what they are supposed to do, getting the type of job 
they think they ought to have, never being offered a true alternative unless they themselves 
struggle and find one on their own, thereby losing security in most aspects. 
 
One issue which has been discussed endlessly in media, academia and by the population at 
large
152
 is the need for an incentive for women to marry and give birth to children. What is 
less discussed, however, is that men too need an incentive to be more included in the 
household, both as members of it and in taking part in child rearing, and the system needs to 
function in order for this to happen. My conclusion based on these conversations is that so far, 
there is a great deal of change in views on gender at the work place, with positive attitudes 
towards gender equality becoming the norm, rather than the exception. That is, women‘s 
situations at work do change and evolve, as well as the views on their situations. Men‘s 
situations, on the other hand, remain the same as they have for many decades.  
 
Conversely, in the home, there is little change to be found in the views on women and their 
roles as mothers, while for men and fathers, there is evidence of an emergence of change in 
the views. What eventually revealed itself from my interviews was that salaryman 
masculinity is still the normative, hegemonic ideal, which may indicate why there is less 
demand for equality in the home as there is in the workplace. In the office, most companies 
are now accustomed to women working and building careers, but instead of providing for a 
more diverse range of employment practices suited for both women and men equally, women 
are expected to conform to the working styles of salarymen, thereby perpetuating the 
hegemonic salaryman masculinity ideal.  
 
This in turn actively obstructs not just women‘s, but men‘s opportunities to balance their 
family life with their work. Another way of describing this would be to say that my 
interviewees arguably felt that labour and family were two concepts which were inherently 
disconnected from one another, giving me the impression that they felt that the gender 
ideologies associated with the two concepts were largely incompatible with each other. 
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Explaining the dichotomy of work and home: The power of mothers 
 
An interesting and relevant point brought up by Ishii-Kuntz in her research about Japanese 
fathers in 1993 is that mothers will often actively participate in the promotion of the 
masculine image of their husbands to their children.
153
 Though absent from home large parts 
of the week or even longer, the fathers are psychologically present in the family. Her 
informants reported that the mothers spent a lot of time with their children, both of the 
disciplinary and recreational nature, but they would still portray their husbands as ―decision 
makers‖ and ―bosses of the house‖. Ishii-Kuntz also notes that mothers have also been known 
to use their husbands as disciplinary tools when the children misbehave. She adds that many 
mothers were keen to make sure that their sons in particular would understand the ―power‖ 
and ―authority‖ of their fathers, because the sons need a strong and responsible male role 
model. Therefore, she writes, ―the traditional gender roles, that is, man as breadwinner and a 
woman as homemaker, seem to be perpetuated both through direct mother-child interaction 
and through indirect father-child interaction mediated by mothers.‖154 In the discourse of 
mother involvement in child rearing in South Korea, this is to a certain degree even more 
evident. While South Korea is a predominantly patriarchal society, mothers are more often 
than not recognised having ―mother power‖ or ―wifely power‖, due to the fathers‘ continuous 
absence from the home.
155
 In essence, Korean households are ―patriarchies without 
patriarchs‖156. These mothers are in charge of all social and intellectual education of their 
children, and thereby perpetuate the idea of the authoritarian patriarch even though he is not 
in fact present. 
 
Looking back over the experiences of my interviewees, there are strong indications that their 
views on gender and parenthood have been significantly affected by their own upbringing. 
For Shinji, it is important that a parent raises their child, as opposed to a third party, and he 
prefers knowing that there is one parent at home at all times, even if this was not really 
necessary. He was keen to get across that it was not his personal opinion that women should 
stay at home, but rather society‘s fault for not easily allowing them to do otherwise.  
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Takurō also felt that the mother alone should raise children – not even the father. In his view, 
there is a great deal of difference between men and women when it comes to parenthood. His 
own father was very much a dominant figure in their household, even though he was typically 
away for large portions of Takurō‘s life. 
 
The case of Keitarō was curious because though he was raised in a dual-earning household 
and to this day is surrounded by career women, none of these factors have contributed to him 
feeling differently about women in the home. Considering this, I think that influence coming 
from the people Keitarō grew up around, and society in general, was far stronger than any 
influence from his parents. He was raised largely in a kindergarten and it is likely that much 
of his basic world views would have originated there. Keitarō trivialised his own future role 
as father, by saying that taking leave ―just‖ to raise a child would not be a valid option for 
him. He acknowledged that career women may meet restrictions and problems when they 
have children, but looks at this as more of a fact of life, rather than a problem to be solved. 
 
Yōji told me he believed that since he supports women working and developing careers, he 
will raise his future children in a radically different way from the way he was raised. 
However, he became conflicted when addressing his concerns that it would be selfish of a 
career woman to focus on her work, rather than raising children. He said that he had not 
considered how much work, and what kind of effort, has to be put into child rearing, revealing 
that he knew very little about the subject.  
 
Likewise, when Shūji was asked what being a good father means to him, he said that it is to 
spend fun time with children in the weekends, going to ball-games and theme parks, but said 
nothing about actually raising a child. Possibly, he believes that the act of raising children is 
someone else‘s job (either his wife‘s or grandparents, or even someone entirely different). In 
conclusion, all five of the interviewees mentioned here, all expressed in some form that 
childhood was tremendously formative on their views on gender equality due to the roles of 
the mother and father in their lives. 
 
Pleck is of the opinion that since mothers are central figures in children‘s lives from the start, 
it will result in both boys and girls initially identifying with a female role model. As a result, 
in the future, the children will have more difficulty in reaching a properly defined concept of a 
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masculine identity.
157
 Importantly, this argument can be applied heavily to Japan, a modern 
society dominated by family structures which positions the mothers as the one to raise the 
children, with fathers being mostly absent throughout their children‘s lives. Potuchek also 
discusses gender role models, saying that they are deeply rooted in childhood by learning. 
Consequently any change in gender roles is very slow to come about, as children must be 
taught by their parents, something which essentially means that any slight change or shift will 
only come once a generation, if at all.
158
 
 
Explaining the dichotomy of work and home: Gender boundaries 
 
West and Zimmerman say that because differentiation between genders is unavoidable, it 
therefore requires legitimisation – the difference between men and women must be perceived 
as normal and natural, or in other words, legitimate. Gender to them is an ―ideological device, 
which produces, reproduces, and legitimates the choices and limits that are predicated on sex 
category‖159. Here, the concept of gender boundaries comes in useful: negotiating across 
gender boundaries can function as a reinforcement and legitimisation of the pre-set gender 
categories. Both women and men have their own domains in which they have their own form 
of control. Potuchek argues that the concept of ―breadwinning‖ is a crucial gender boundary, 
as men realistically have a very limited choice of what they can do outside this boundary. 
This is in contrast to women, who are starting to expand and stretch their own boundaries.
160
 
In this sense, women become more independent, because they are not in the end restrained by 
their jobs and can either turn to their families or their husbands for support, whereas men will 
often find themselves in a helpless situation if they are not providing for their families.
161
  
If men and women both have to be invited to cross boundaries in order to be able to 
participate, then it is possible in the case of Japan to argue that women do not invite men 
sufficiently into their realms. If a man were to step down from his otherwise pre-defined role 
as breadwinner and becomes for instance a house husband, he will lose too much (credibility, 
economical security, social status) and gain too little (emotional closeness to family). The 
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choice to cross over to the other boundary completely simply becomes irrational. Men‘s 
motivation to choose differently from the safe ground they are otherwise used to cannot come 
out of nowhere. Some motivation can arise from necessity (wives working by choice; 
unfavourable family economy) or a rebellion (reaction to own upbringing).
162
 But in order to 
fulfil that motivation, another factor is necessary: social support, from any instance (family, 
work environment, state, neighbourhood, friends). If women only reluctantly invite men into 
the realm of child rearing, allowing men to do the less important tasks, there will not be 
enough motivation generated for a long-term change. 
Lynne Segal points out a different aspect of the same phenomenon, where it seems that 
women‘s labour capacity is being exploited by men, in how they do not take seriously the 
hard work women do at home.
163
 They fail to appreciate the levels of work which cannot be 
measured in wages, and end up having a simplistic view of child rearing and other household 
tasks due to lack of experience, as demonstrated by some of my interviewees. Allison‘s 
research about salarymen visiting hostess clubs to relieve their stress both from work and at 
home brings another dimension to this discussion.
164
 Her study is arguably cynical, as she 
suggests men cannot find true relaxation and comfort at home, and that there isn‘t enough 
incentive for them to keep returning. I cannot base my own research on her observations, 
because first of all, none of my interviewees had families and children yet and secondly 
because none of them went to hostess clubs regularly. But her results support the argument 
about gender boundaries. There is something contrary to normal societal norms that the men 
in Allison‘s study feel that they must escape to a third party in order to shed the stress from 
both work and family life, as one‘s home normally is seen as a place where one can feel 
comfortable – indeed, ―at home‖. This suggests that women perhaps fail to fully let men into 
their space, and not allowing them share as much in the house as they should learn to be able 
to do. If this is indeed the case, then the result is that instead of attempting to cross and enter 
each other‘s boundaries, men avoid them altogether because women keep their boundary 
sealed shut. These two actions would perpetuate and strengthen the seal further, instead of 
communicating across it, coming to some form of compromise. I do not believe that Allison‘s 
research is representative of a large part of salarymen, and especially not men in general, but 
                                                 
162 
Joseph H. Pleck, Michael E. Lamb, and James A. Levine, "Epilog: Facilitating Future Change in Men's 
Family Roles," in Men's Changing Roles in the Family, ed. Robert A. Lewis and Marvin B. Sussman (New York 
and London: The Haworth Press, 1986), 13. 
163
 Segal, Slow Motion: Changing Masculinities, Changing Men, 41. 
164
 Allison, Nightwork: Sexuality, Pleasure and Corporate Masculinity in a Tokyo Hostess Club. 
67 
 
the concept that home in the end becomes unfamiliar and distant for the men is contiguous to 
what is often described elsewhere. 
Inclinations towards a positive view of involvement in family and child care 
 
For Shigeo, when it came to the notion of spending time with the family, he emphasised the 
importance of quality versus quantity, assuring me that he would communicate better with his 
children than his father did with him, even though he did not express any particular desire to 
take paternity leave as a means to do this. Similarly, both Yoshio and Tōru told me that taking 
long-term paternity leave would not necessarily serve the best purpose. They believed that 
balancing work and family by reducing overtime and eliminating weekend work would be 
ideal, offering a much better influence on children‘s lives during the most crucial years of 
their childhood. 
 
Though Yoshio had the view described above, he was also one of two participants who told 
me that he would definitely consider taking paternity leave in the future. The other participant 
was Seiichi, who was even more decisive in the matter, having no doubt that he would take 
paternity leave at once when he has children. He believes it is only positive if men and 
women are both considered equal in all aspects and that the state and its institutions must 
realise this. Both Yoshio and Seiichi admitted to wanting to change their family life by taking 
a radically different path from their own experiences of childhood.  
 
Yoshio experienced his father‘s distance as something distinctly negative and told me that he 
wanted to provide a warmer environment for his future children. On the other end of the 
spectrum, Seiichi felt overprotected growing up, and wants to provide leeway for his own 
children so that they can do whatever they feel inspired to grow up as a well-adjusted, happy 
individual. Neither of them expressed any anxiety about the societal repercussions that are 
associated with paternity leave and male child-rearing, being convinced that what thought was 
the correct stance. 
 
However, Shūji surprised me greatly in that he was the only participant who had actually 
taken matters into his own hands, by becoming the labour union leader in his company branch 
and actively proposing workers‘ paternity leave, in addition to the maternity leave already in 
place. Though he does not believe it is possible that the company will agree to implement a 
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long-term paternity leave so early in the bargaining process, he still sees this as a start of a 
movement in his company. His proposal to have paternity leave is indisputably an active step 
in the direction of equality at work. 
 
The results of Hidaka‘s research in relation to childcare were homogenous, overall. Men in all 
three of her study groups were to some degree or another convinced of the gender divide in 
child-rearing. Both the groups aged 60 to 80, and 40 to 59, were extremely busy with work 
because of the economic growth which happened post-WWII and just before the bursting of 
the economic bubble in the early 1990s.
165
 None of these men had been present much during 
their children‘s childhoods and were largely guiltless in leaving all childcare in the hands of 
their wives. On the other hand, the third and youngest group, aged 20 to 39, were said to be 
less busy than their predecessors due to the economic recession, but regardless still not 
inclined to take part in jointly raising their children with their wives. While they understood 
that fathers‘ participation can be instrumental in improving the condition of the family, they 
did not get actively involved in it.
166
 Moreover, Hidaka also found that her participants often 
implied that being an economic provider for the family was what they called ―proper child 
rearing‖, associating holiday activities and infrequent, but fun, interactions with their children 
as sufficient childcare.  
 
I have found little evidence in my interviews that men are feeling a direct threat towards their 
masculinity as such, but scepticism and uncertainty is apparent in some cases. What society 
has expected of men is continues to undergo change, making it difficult to fit into the new 
expectations as the demands faced are increasingly inconsistent. One can no longer count on 
the fact that there will be no need to take part in home life, but there remains expectation to 
work with the same tenacity as they always have. Some may still deny that change is 
necessary, but regardless, more and more men in Japan seem to be attempting to adjust to 
their surroundings, albeit with an ambivalent approach. Mathews draws on this notion, saying 
that men in Japan today are much more required to be at home and actually participate there 
physically and psychologically than before.
167
 While a new cultural ideology is slowly 
emerging, there still remain considerable structural problems, simply because the work of a 
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salaryman is too demanding and requires too much time and energy. One emerging ideal is, 
in other words, not as much a comforting or supportive notion as it is a new source of anxiety, 
adding more demands to lives of both men and women, rather than relieving them. Hence, a 
new dilemma arises, where new, competing ideologies of ―father involvement‖ come against 
the traditional ideals of fathers‘ absent authoritarianism and salaryman masculinity.168 
 
To contrast with the previous chapter, I have found more similarities between Hidaka‘s results 
and my own in the context of family, than in the context of work. Some of the participants, 
like Nobuhiko, Hayato, Keitarō and Takurō, were strongly convinced that there was a clear 
difference between mothers and fathers, and that mothers should raise children and no one 
else. The reasons behind this I have attempted to uncover earlier, in the sub-chapter 
―Reinforcing and perpetuating gender stereotypes‖. However, I would argue that there is 
another emerging ideal of active father involvement, and that this ideal is more likely to 
continue to spread as dominant if one assumes that younger generations will adopt similar 
attitudes, based on the results presented in this thesis. 
 
The majority of my interviewees were more similar to Hidaka‘s youngest group and in some 
cases, even more positive towards gender equality. Shinji was conflicted because he wanted 
to take part in the child rearing process, but did not know how to do it, due to societal and 
institutional constraints. Ryōta, Shigeo and Yōji felt more or less the same way as Shinji. By 
contrast, Shūji declared that he had taken active steps at his job in order to achieve more 
gender equality at the office in form of proposing to make paternity leave available to men in 
his company. Finally, Yoshio and Seiichi both showed desire to be actively involved in their 
future children‘s lives, both in terms of taking paternity leave, and wanting to be present in a 
physical and emotional way as much as possible for their family.  
 
All of Hidaka‘s research participants had not expressed any particular desire or interest to 
actively take part in their children‘s upbringing other than providing for them economically, 
and I would argue that in comparison, I have found distinct changes happening over time, 
considering that my participants are overall much younger than most of her own. Seeing it 
from a social constructionist viewpoint, ultimately the individual is responsible for the 
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perpetuation of the status quo and subsequently, change. Following this, it would be 
reasonable to assume that there might be an indication of a rapid movement towards gender 
equality in the context of family life, as well as work. 
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7 Masculinity and life purpose 
―If you work for a living, why do you kill yourself working?‖169 
In this chapter, I will summarise the viewpoints all of my interviewees concerning individual 
life purpose, before I discuss them together with the articles of Mathews‘ and Hidaka in the 
context of whether or not their life‘s purpose is interlinked with the meaning of their 
masculinity. Finally, as before, I will compare the views of my interviewees to the results of 
Hidaka to confirm whether or not there has been a change over time. 
7.1 Personal narratives 
Nobuhiko 
In general, Nobuhiko was very positive about his experiences at work, and had a hard time 
finding anything negative to say when asked to elaborate on the downsides of his work 
environment. I believe that there are two main ways this can be interpreted: either he truly 
feels better than others about his job or he wants me to see his situation in a flattering light. I 
have decided to believe what he said as fact, mostly because in person he behaved in a 
relaxed, unstressed way and genuinely seemed like a very positive individual. Finally, he 
showed a good attitude towards the work-life balance, showing no hesitation to say that free 
time and fun were more important than the company, and that he lives for the fun he can have 
in his free time. It just seems a fortunate outcome for him that he is one of the lucky few who 
really enjoys what they do at work – something which is relevant to their personal interests. In 
his future, he would like to try and work abroad, and he is not worried about the logistics if he 
at that point is still involved with his girlfriend. Overall, he is focused on his own future, 
without worry of what might be demanded of him professionally. 
Hayato 
Hayato was quite conflicted when it came to how he felt about Japan, and his life there. He 
strongly implied that he thinks ―Japanese culture‖ is strange or awkward, and said he didn‘t 
feel comfortable in this culture, where a lot of things to him feel ―wrong‖. With the exception 
of his rather traditional views on fatherhood as described earlier in chapter 6, ―Masculinity 
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and family‖, he is progressive and has a strong sense of his own individual identity. To him, 
―Japanese culture‖ is too old fashioned and worn out. He expresses a wish for  things to be 
different – that there would at least be more ways of life to choose from. 
The way Hayato described his working style made me realise he is very much an ―every man 
for himself‖ sort of person, or in other words, a person with a strong consciousness of his 
rights. As a result, he is able and willing to distinguish between the public and private 
spheres. Hayato would work as hard as he could within the typical hours during the working 
week, but he would never work in the weekend, even if he was told to do so. Instead, he 
would rather work extra hard in the weekdays to free his weekend from work-related stress. 
He tries his utmost to avoid conforming to the mapped out salaryman rules and ideals in his 
free time, constantly trying to find ways to get around it. He is cynical, but realistic. 
When I asked him directly, he was unable to answer my question: does he work for a living or 
is he living for work? Hayato eventually said if he had to choose, he would say that he works 
for a living because free time to him has a lot of value. Again, he pointed out that if you are to 
spend half your life at a work place, you might just as well be motivated to do it and like it, to 
do a better job and to be happy about it, but that in the end, it is the free time and what you do 
with it that counts. 
Shinji 
Shinji disagreed with the common Japanese idea that husbands have to support their wives 
and families economically. He felt that a wife should be a best friend and partner, not an 
occupation. Love to him is important when it comes to choice of partner and he says he would 
respect his partner‘s wishes no matter what she would choose to do in her life. He did not 
consider the possibility of her becoming the main provider of the family, but he believed 
strongly that his future wife should at the very least be equal to him in regards to work. 
Shinji said he felt hopeful when he started looking for work. Most of all, he wanted to work in 
a publishing company, but not matter how hard he tried, he did not get the jobs he applied for. 
He said this made him feel under tremendous pressure, because his peers were not having the 
trouble he was with finding a job. Eventually, he compromised by opting to work at a 
company he didn‘t care about, but which was at least adjacent to his personal interests. He 
said that his work environment is generally good with a generally comfortable social 
atmosphere, but that his role was simply not creative enough to make him happy. He told me 
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he had decided that he plans to work in a different job in the future, where he can be more 
creative. 
When asked about his opinion on whether he was working for a living or living for work, he 
said that it was a dilemma to him. If he were to consider what he was in fact living for, or his 
―big purpose‖ in life, he felt that working hard just to save money just was not enough. He 
said that he wants to experience many different things and have a fun life. He does not mean 
that he has a great purpose thought out already, but to him, putting the emphasis on work over 
everything else, becoming one with it, is too great a sacrifice. But at the same time, he does 
not have the time to pursue his personal interests and goals because he is so busy at work. He 
does not particularly enjoy what he is doing and in his words, ―dedicates all his life to the 
company‖ losing the ability to focus on what is important to him. He feels that if he were to 
quit right now, he would need a really good purpose; something specific that he needs to 
accomplish. Not having that incentive makes it difficult to consider quitting even if he doesn‘t 
like his job much and feels uninspired in it.  
Yoshio 
Prior to starting his job, Yoshio believed he would be extremely busy, and that he would 
never have any free time, but when I spoke to him, he said it was quite the opposite. He said 
his social life and home life with his fiancée had never suffered any severe consequences on 
account of his job situation. Yoshio‘s company is reputed for its flexibility and well-
functioning welfare system, which significantly contributes to him feeling more relaxed, 
despite occasionally having to work very long hours. Yoshio told me, surprisingly, that he did 
not feel very restrained in his finances or job at all. He is in charge of his own schedule which 
was particularly evident when trying to organise the interview. We were able to meet anytime 
and anywhere I wanted, regardless of it being daytime or weekdays. 
Before Yoshio started looking for work, he aspired to be an artist and working in advertising 
apparently gives him such an input and ability to develop himself in an artistic sort of way. At 
first, based on the things he was saying it seemed that Yoshio was implying that as a result of 
this he is unable to separate work and free time completely, when he said that both his work 
and his free time are really the same thing for him. But as it transpired, he was trying to get 
across that he enjoys work so much that there is no real difference.  
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Yoshio comes across as both highly rational and emotional. His rationality comes to the 
surface when presented with the situation of paternity leave, because he says he will simply 
work as hard as he can, so he can come home early and avoid working overtime. To him, it is 
much more important to have the balance of some time with his family and some time away 
at work, rather than a lot of time with either. However, he was emotional about spending a lot 
of time with his future children, and even feels sorry if he finds himself unable because of 
some outside restraint.  
Compared to the others I spoke to, Yoshio had a different view on kindergartens. He did not 
immediately shun it as a negative institution, but that he thinks children get opportunities to 
grow and develop as individuals by being around other people and other adults than the 
parents themselves. He never mentioned, like others did, that the children would feel bad 
going to kindergarten; he simply said that he would personally feel sorry, just because he 
wants to raise his children himself. In this sense, he rationally believes that going to such an 
institution is not automatically bad for a child, but that ideally, he wants to have a whole and 
happy family. 
Keitarō 
When Keitarō has children, he wants them to pursue whatever talents that they may have, 
regardless of gender. But no matter how he presented his ideologies in abstract terms, he 
could not see a realistic equal gender reality in his own case. He does not doubt his own 
masculinity and never waivers from having to work hard, but the fact that he expressed he 
wants more time with his wife was very interesting. He is yearning for a better partnership, 
not only a ―spouse-as-profession‖ relationship. He seems to be a private sphere-conscious 
person, strongly focused on his intimate inner circle above all. 
However, it seems to me that for Keitarō, family life and children did not seem like a priority, 
even if he generally wanted them both. He is so immersed in his job that to him (and to his 
co-workers), work is the most important thing. Keitarō did not seem bitter at all that he can‘t 
get the rest he needs, this is just the way he lives and he does not need it to be otherwise. He 
frequently referred back to how him and his co-workers are making a sacrifice. 
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Ryōta 
At present, Ryōta is not doing what he considers involving and interesting tasks. He is only an 
assistant, mostly performing menial, clerical duties. What he is doing is arguably not a typical 
salaryman‘s job, but he is still working very hard, long hours. Ryōta, however, did not seem 
too worried about this. He has ambitions to learn key skills from this company in order to be 
able to work at a bigger advertising company later, or even start a company of his own. He is 
ambitious enough to say that it is his own freedom to do so if he wishes. Even though being a 
freelancer in Japan is virtually impossible if you want stable income, he still feels like he 
wants to at least try, and had the confidence to tell me that he has the right to do it. Right now, 
though, he feels that he doesn‘t have enough confidence or skill to quit his job and start his 
own business just yet. 
Ryōta then told me that even though he is aware that he needs to focus and go out to meet 
people to make his network grow, he still values the little time he has to himself left over 
networking in the end. He does not have the capacity to truly expand his horizons and 
network effectively right now, understanding that it requires a lot of effort and energy, which 
he cannot afford to invest in right now. It seems a dilemma to me, as he wants to start his own 
company or work in a bigger company and has strong ambitions, but at the same time, he 
cannot find energy to do it. Ryōta blames it mostly on himself, not so much on the lack of 
time, considering it his own persona laziness which is impeding him.  
Seiichi 
Seiichi told me that it is in Japan considered to be good common sense to look for a job while 
a university student, in keeping with the point I mentioned earlier in how in Japan, education 
is made redundant by recruitment from such an early stage. He expressed some regret in 
quitting the part-time job he had when he was still studying, and recalled it nostalgically as a 
time where he enjoyed more freedom and earned good money – more than he was earning 
when I spoke to him. He mostly left his part-time job as his peers were all looking for full-
time work as it seemed sensible to join them. He was emphatic in saying that he made a poor 
choice, and in his current situation he fells uneasy, and that he needs a different working life. 
However, he was aware that the part-time role would not have been a perfect long-term job, 
offering little to no mental stimulation and no possibility for promotion or expansion into 
other roles. 
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Seiichi‘s company required him to move suddenly to Hiroshima against his will, a decision 
which he expressed a lot of discomfort about, suddenly finding himself with no friends or 
network to fall back on. To him, it was too much to ask, and he began to feel helpless. He did 
not hide how unhappy this made him. Having to stay there all his life was the worst scenario 
that he could imagine. Seiichi always wanted to stay in Tokyo or at least in Kansai, which is 
the second biggest commercial and residential hub in Japan, but the companies don‘t usually 
consider the individual wishes of a worker and send them wherever it is convenient for the 
corporation. This is probably one of the features of being a salaryman that makes the 
salaryman feel the least in control over his situation – the overhanging fear of being 
transferred abruptly, without much warning. Typically, they get a warning, but the workers 
are not told where they are being sent, a piece of information they wait until the very last 
minute to give up, according to him and general agreement around the table. I get a feeling 
that to him, friends and personal life would always be a priority over work for Seiichi. 
Before he started his job, Seiichi knew that there was always a chance of him being 
transferred, but he did not consider it a realistic possibility for him. He had also expected to 
work much less, but instead, he often worked until 1am, having no spare time at all. He said 
that he was unable to adjust to the company‘s demands and felt it was difficult to be in his 
new office in Hiroshima: Without a doubt, Seiichi‘s work environment was very stressful and 
tense. Specifically, he noted some of the behaviour of his colleagues as being particularly 
reflective of this, explaining to me that people will take out their frustrations on each other. 
Eventually, he got depressed and went on sick leave: 
―I changed work places in August and my superiors all changed. These new superiors were the kind of 
superiors who used power harassment a lot. Gradually, though, [if you find yourself in the middle of it], 
it becomes more and more difficult to define the expression ―power harassment‖. Even if they scream at 
you like crazy, or if they give you completely impossible problems to solve, your resistance still grows. 
But if you look at the word in its pure form, that‘s what ‗power harassment‘ really is. There are shouts 
and tempers [everywhere], you hear one shitty thing after another. I think it‘s close to sexual 
harassment: If the woman thinks it is [sexual harassment], it is, right? But if you ask what they did 
specifically, they did things like calling me in the middle of the night, screaming at me. If I were to 
express myself, they would [interpret it as an excuse to get out of hard work]. Little by little, I started 
hating my job, I went to the hospital and they told me it was depression, so I took some time off. It‘s not 
been determined how long it‘ll be yet, but maybe I won‘t even go back. And even if I were to go back, I 
think I‘d go back to a completely different department somewhere else, but right now, I don‘t feel much 
like returning at all, to be frank. Right now, the company thinks that I‘m thinking about going back, but 
that it‘s not the right time yet, but no, I‘m not going back. I think I might quit.‖ 
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At the start of the interview, Seiichi insisted that he was only on sick leave and had not quit 
his job yet, but at the end of this passage, it is almost as if he is deciding right there and then 
that he will quit his job after sick leave. I later found out that he did quit and started a job 
which was much closer to his passions, where he was equally busy, but much happier. When 
he was a child, his dream was to become a politician. He remembered an essay he wrote for a 
class during the interview, where he said that he wanted to ‗run Japan‘. Now he works as an 
assistant or trainee for a politician in a political party. It is impossible to determine whether 
this interview was the catalyst for this big change, but I do believe I interviewed him at a 
turning point in his life. 
When asked about the dilemma of working for a living versus living for work, his first 
instinct was to emphasise just how much he would really like to just have fun and relax, but 
he remembered that there is also a possibility of actually enjoying whatever job you might 
get. He ended up on the same spot as Shinji and many others: that it‘s a dilemma and a 
question of choice. He says that if he got a hundred billion yen right now, he would quit his 
job and live life having fun. But at the same time, maybe then he would finally be free to find 
a job he would actually be interested in. 
Takurō 
During our conversation, Takurō said he constantly comments on and questions everything 
happening in his company, saying he always demands reason and refuses to go down without 
a fight. He said he was an individualist, and that he refuses to submit to common consensus 
without good reason. Because he is currently working in his company to primarily gain 
experience in running a company so he can be self-employed in the future, as opposed to 
building a career, it is likely that any work-based conflict that would arise from his attitude 
would have little repercussion.  
Takurō maintained that he will not subdue his own personality to fit in a work environment 
that usually does not accept individualists, and if asked to do something he does not 
understand, he would ask why. He added that he would feel anxious and stressed if he found 
himself in a situation where he would be unable to argue his viewpoint.  
With a generally positive outlook on life and work, Takurō came across as a true opportunist. 
He started working as a salaryman not because he felt pressure to do so, but because he was 
genuinely curious about what all the other salarymen were talking about, and wanted to 
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experience it himself. He told me confidently that in the future, he will definitely quit his job. 
To him, he said that life is like an adventure, and that he wants to explore as many things as 
possible, ultimately culmination in the creation of his own business in the customer service 
industry.  
Shigeo 
Shigeo also told me that did not foresee himself staying in his current company all his life. He 
had no reason to quit yet, but he does not see any reason to stay either. He clearly indicated 
that he had little intention of basing his future career here, but that it is rather only a starting 
point, but he did very much plan to work. He said that he has too much motivation, drive and 
purpose to prioritise private time ahead of work. It came across as if he felt he would waste 
significant resources of energy if he were to focus solely on his personal life. Shigeo told me 
that he would ideally like to create a ―perfect symbiosis‖ between his life goals and his career 
goals, aiming for an enjoyable job which was closely linked with his hobbies. 
Yōji 
Conversely, Yōji said early on in the interview that he never wanted to get a job that he truly 
enjoyed, for instance something involving music which has always been his hobby. He felt 
that by doing that he would lose genuine interest in it. However, he no longer has any time for 
hobbies at all, as a result of his long working hours. Still, he insists that he does not actually 
consider his job a real ―job‖ because he is free while he is working, as everything he does is 
based on projects and the emphasis is put on finishing the project before the deadline, not the 
manner in which it is done.  
Yōji showing himself to have a positive outlook on working, seeing his job as a fleeting 
opportunity to learn and gain something. At that point, when the opportunity has passed, he 
said he would most likely quit and find a new job. He does not mention anything about being 
worried or anxious about a future job change and is fully focused on what he himself can get 
out of it by doing so. It is worth noting that since the interview, he has changed jobs and 
moved on to a different international advertising company. 
Shūji 
Shūji told me that he loves (he explicitly used this word in English) his company and wants to 
work there all his life. However, he is worried about the economic future of his company 
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because of the worldwide recession. If it were to go bankrupt, he told me that he had no doubt 
that he will search for a new job in the same industry.  
But for Shūji, this was a result of more than just loving his industry. He communicated that 
his reputation was so important, he would rather continue working there than force his wife to 
endure the shame of being married to someone who had quit their industry and moved on. It 
did not seem that he felt particularly negative about this, though. 
Outside of the household, Shūji also desired a good reputation in the neighbourhood, saying 
that it was necessary for him to earn enough money and get a good reputation in just about 
every instance of his life to feel satisfied. When asked what he would do if he were to win the 
lottery, he promptly replied that he would still continue to work in the same place just to keep 
up his reputation as a hard-working man. 
Tōru 
At first, Tōru wanted to become a journalist, but felt discouraged by the seemingly tough and 
demanding entry exams to jobs, as well as the reputation of the job itself being very hard in 
general. He told me that he chose his first job because he felt it was the best way to ―enter 
society‖ (shakaijin ni naru) or in other words, the best way to become an adult and do 
something worthwhile, but that he never liked the job. 
Tōru speculated aloud on the differences between a draining, but interesting job versus a 
comparatively stress-less job which is unstimulating. He said that he was very stable, and 
never felt stressed anymore, but that he does not feel stimulated or inspired to do anything and 
feels like he never creates anything. It seems that he is not yet sure what he really wants and 
that he is only in the process of finding this out. He wants to do more and receive more 
responsibilities at work, so that he has the chance to create more from within, giving him the 
opportunity to draw up plans, gather information, direct and use his own abilities. Tōru said 
that his free time was more important than work, but that he felt like it is a little sad to admit 
work was just a means of generating income, and nothing else. 
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7.2 Discussion 
Where do men’s loyalties lie? 
The traditional Japanese firm was typically a community environment where all the necessary 
things a man could ever need were gathered in exchanged for the men‘s loyalty and hard 
work.
170
 In other words, there was supposed to be a singular welfare system in every 
company, where the workers and the company would become mutually dependent on each 
other to make everything go round. This mutual dependency works in such a way that if the 
company were to go bankrupt, this would become a significant threat to the workers‘ security. 
If this security is compromised, and workers start to leave their jobs, this in turn becomes a 
threat to the company‘s survival, increasing their chances of bankruptcy. 
Financial benefits to the workers also greatly depend on the company‘s performance, so it is 
in the worker‘s interest to work as hard as possible.171 Ultimately though, it was the worker 
who would suffer the greatest consequences if he were to quit. Hirokuni Tabata is sceptical 
towards the same school of thought that believes Japanese workers are truly loyal to their 
companies, the same school of thought which thinks that the workers continue to work as hard 
as they do because they need to maintain their position in the company to secure their long-
term employment. Examining the widespread belief can lead to the argument that perhaps the 
employees in Japanese company communities are more inclined towards individual, rather 
than collective interests.
172
 Another widely held belief is that it is not in the worker‘s interest 
to move from one company to the next because of the social stigma of being unable to keep a 
job for a long time or not being able to get along with their co-workers.
173
 There are such 
severe punitive consequences from quitting your first company early (never being able to get 
back on track, having to start again at the lowest position or become self-employed, lose 
seniority wage rises and retirement allowances, plus suffering a wage cut) that this often 
works as a disincentive for men to even consider quitting.
174
 Instead, they keep working, 
using cultural legitimacy as an informal disciplining mechanism for themselves. 
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Ikigai – finding an individual life purpose 
Mathews argues that there has been a clear gender divide of ikigai in Japanese society and 
that although this divide has been challenged by recent factors such as the declining birthrate 
and increasing female employment, in practical terms the ikigai of men has remained the 
same.
175
 According to him, men are still expected to fulfil the salaryman masculinity ideal. 
Being restrained as they are by pressure from their companies, men find themselves unable to 
pursue the ikigai of family or individual desire. His research in the article, ―Can a ‗real man‘ 
live for his family?‖, is based on his own interviews that were conducted in 1989-90 with 27 
participants, as well as interviews and media reports from 1999-2000. 
Mathews found that the younger the man, the less commitment showed towards their work, 
which he concluded to be due to the massive difference between less affluent post-war Japan 
and more affluent Japan right before the bursting of the bubble.
176
 Some of his younger 
participants expressed with regret that men in Japan don‘t have individual identities and don‘t 
know what freedom means.
177
 Surprisingly, this negativity went even further, as an older 
participant said that if Japanese men had not put as much effort into generating so much 
money while living solely for work, it would seem, then Japan might not have experienced its 
economy problems in the 1990s.
178
  
Unsurprisingly, Hidaka also found that for most of her participants in her oldest group (aged 
60 to 80) that their ikigai was work.
179
 These participants were proud of their role as kigyō 
senshi who rebuilt the nation of Japan after WWII. Moving on to examine the result of her 
more middle-aged group (aged 40 to 59), she found much more variation in what the men 
considered their ikigai.
180
 Some of them considered work to be their sole ikigai, yet some 
believe their job to be the embodiment of self-realisation, consequently becoming ikigai as a 
personal life goal. 
Mathews concluded that while the younger salarymen no longer felt themselves that work 
was their sole purpose in life, they still had to continue working tremendously hard out of 
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sheer practical need, thereby making work their de facto ikigai.
181
 This concurs with Tabata‘s 
argument that the consequences of quitting their jobs to pursue anything else more desirable 
would be so severe that they work as a disincentive for men to consider quitting, adding that 
the workers are no longer as unconditionally loyal to their companies as their predecessors. 
Interestingly, Mathews reports that in the media, ikigai as a personal life goal is promoted far 
more prominently than ikigai as work, which leads him to believe that culturally, devoting 
your life to the company no longer has masculine validity, but  institutionally, it remains 
ambiguous.
182
 
Mathews could not find many men who considered ikigai to be family. He deemed this to be 
caused by the previously mentioned de facto ikigai as work taking up all of the men‘s time 
and energy.
183
 In fact, some of his respondents felt that devotion to family was a chore, or 
service, because while the need for being present in the family both physically and mentally 
increases, the need to do similarly for the company has by no means diminished, resulting in 
pressure and stress coming from two sides, instead of one. This argument is similar to what I 
discussed at the end of chapter 6, ―Masculinity and family‖, and I believe that the two notions 
are indeed interlinked. However, as I also said during that discussion, I have found some 
evidence of a new development, whereby men are detaching themselves from this pressure by 
adopting a more gender-equal approach towards the different parts of their lives. I will 
continue discussing this point in sub-chapter ―The transformation of salaryman masculinity 
through ikigai‖ below. Mathews‘ final conclusion was that men will probably go from having 
their ikigai as work directly to having their ikigai as self, bypassing ikigai as family. He 
believes that having family as ikigai will only get harder and less prominent in the future.
184
 
Of Hidaka‘s younger participants (aged 20 to 39), only two cases openly considered their 
ikigai to be work.
185
 The rest of them either thought of their ikigai being a combination of 
family and the self, or in some cases, only family. Hidaka agrees with Mathews in that even 
for younger generations, work has become their ikigai, albeit in a de facto way, and that work 
serves as a means to realise personal goals, moreso than serving the company. 
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Similar research has been conducted in the context of Korean corporate organisations, 
attempting to uncover which elements of their lives Korean saellôrimaen most committed to 
over a length of time. It was discovered that like Japan, the younger the generation, the less 
loyalty they felt towards their work place.
186
 Work values similarly are slowly changing and 
self-realisation is becoming more important than fulfilling the duty as a member of society or 
family.
187
 However, it seems that no particular evidence was found, at least in this article, of a 
trend emerging of showing increased dedication one‘s life to one‘s family. Family was more 
seen as an entity constructed by the state, and working to provide for it became a burden, 
rather than a desired goal. 
The transformation of salaryman masculinity through ikigai 
Examining my interviewees‘ thoughts and opinions from a broad perspective, there were a 
few who were already employed in a company where they said they found true pleasure in 
their work, and that it was close to their personal interests. Nobuhiko, Yoshio and Yōji 
generally felt that they were lucky to have been employed where they have. For these three, it 
seemed that work was solely for the purpose of self-realisation. Their ikigai is in other words 
focused on the self, as Mathews argued. Yōji did however point out that he didn‘t want to get 
a job directly related to his most important personal interests, for fear of losing genuine 
pleasure in his hobbies, connecting them with stress and pressure. Regardless of this lack of 
relevance to his interests though, Yōji told me he enjoyed his job immensely, even though it 
was quite tough. 
Others I spoke to similarly had their ikigai as the self, or as self-fulfilment, mostly pointing 
out to me that if one is to work half one‘s life, one may just as well enjoy it. Shinji, for 
instance, had more trouble than his peers finding a job he desired and finally, he got a job 
somewhat relevant to his interests, but not one where he feels he can use all his potential. He 
told me that he had definite plans in the future to change to a job where he can be more 
creative. However, he did not feel encouraged enough to change jobs at the time, because he 
doesn‘t have a clear agenda. Shinji admitted to feeling pressured to dedicate his life to the 
company and told me he found it difficult to find time to pursue his interests, of which he has 
many. Ryōta, on the other hand, said he had no intention of staying at his job longer than he 
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had to and emphasised that he was only there to learn just so he could start his own business 
in the future. Takurō, too, was only working at his company to learn, for the same purpose. 
Seiichi pointed out that if he were to become infinitely rich, he would try to find a job which 
he truly enjoyed, rather than rushing to get any job only because your peers are all applying at 
the same time (rather than taking time off to enjoy his wealth). Tōru changed jobs a short 
while into his first employment and found that though he is now working at a place which is 
far more flexible and less demanding, he admits that he misses the intellectual stimuli from 
his previous job. Still, he told me he too plans to get a job in the future where he can both 
enjoy himself and be stimulated on all levels. 
Two of my participants – Keitarō and Shūji – were more inclined towards work in itself being 
ikigai, not self-realisation through work as the others have reported. Shūji also added that the 
reason he felt this way was because reputation is exceedingly important to him. Even if he 
were to become infinitely rich, he would still work at the same company to maintain his 
reputation.  
Interestingly, only two other participants – Shinji and Yoshio – had some inclination toward 
family being ikigai. Shinji told me that he placed a lot of value in marrying for love and 
having an equal relationship with his future wife (though he did not mention much about 
children being a part of this explicitly). Yoshio was the only one who explicitly told me that 
he found just as much meaning in having a family as he found in his work, and in the future, 
he hoped to achieve a perfect balance between the two aspects. 
In summary, based on the combination of Mathews‘ and Hidaka‘s results, and considering 
that the former were released some years prior to the latter, it can be safely assumed that there 
has been a notable development towards ikigai becoming focused on the family and/or self-
realisation, rather than work. Additionally, though I was prior to doing this study convinced 
otherwise, I have found a similarity to what Mathews has predicted, ikigai seems to be 
becoming all about self-realisation, therefore neglecting the importance of family.  
A majority of my interviewees considered their ikigai to be self-realisation, and only two had 
thought of their family to be an equally important aspect of their lives. At this point I feel it is 
important to point out that Hidaka found more evidence of men considering family as their 
ikigai, but these men already had children in most cases. This cannot be said for my 
participants. Only few of them (like Yoshio, Keitarō and Shūji) have realistically considered 
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having children in the foreseeable future, because they were either engaged or married. 
Nevertheless, I believe that this is another argument towards the hegemonic salaryman 
masculinity experiencing a transformation and rather rapidly.  
86 
 
8 Conclusions 
In this thesis, I have discussed the various aspects of salaryman masculinity and outlined how 
it is currently undergoing a transformation. In my research question, I proposed that there was 
an ongoing shift in masculine identity of young salarymen, moving away from the hegemonic 
ideals which have affected older generations, and asked how this could be proven, going on to 
investigate how their identity was changing. I found that it was indeed true that there was a 
shift in masculine identity. In many instances it concurred with Hidaka, who found that there 
has been a certain change from generation to generation, and with Mathews‘, who argued that 
the focus on men‘s ikigai would become self-fulfilment, rather than work, or even family. I 
will now summarise the points I have made throughout the thesis that have led me to this 
conclusion. 
In terms of attitude, I found that there was a great deal of development in the attitudes towards 
gender equality and masculine identity, something that came clear when I compared my 
results to Hidaka‘s as a benchmark. While most of the opinions among Hidaka‘s participants, 
from the age of 20 to 69, ranged from not accepting that women should work at all, to 
believing that women should be at work (as an assistant, only), the majority of my 
participants reported that they both wanted their future wives to work full-time, or indeed do 
whatever she wanted, and that they respected the career women at their work place. This was 
an excellent outcome – but if this is what the younger generation wants, why has it not 
happened? 
As we saw, since the Meiji-period, masculinity in Japan has been formed around the ideology 
specifically constructed by the state in different forms – the patriarchal head of the ie, the 
warrior for the army, and the salaryman. Men were supposed to serve the state and were 
given constructed gender roles to play while the state expanded. During the Meiji-period, 
there was a particular focus on women and their roles as wives and mothers (ryōsai kenbo), 
while men were recognised as the heads of the family by law. Entering the Taishō-period, the 
focus turned the role of men to military machines instead. They were instructed to fight wars 
for the ever-expanding empire, while the women were pigeon-holed into being a reproductive 
machine to provide the state with more able-bodied men who could go out to war. This 
gender ideology quickly fell from favour when Japan was defeated in the WWII. As Japan 
started to rebuild its economy, there arose a need for a new masculinity ideology to best 
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enable all men to partake in what would become one of the fastest-growing economies in the 
world at the time. Instead of being soldiers of the army, the men became soldiers of the 
economy (kigyō senshi), bearing this burden as salarymen. This shows that the concept of 
having a state-serving ideology, and therefore an officially recognised sense of self-worth is 
deeply entrenched in the national psyche, which has today resulted in making the attainment 
of the ideal of crucial importance to modern Japanese men. 
We then saw how this damaged salarymen‘s personal lives. Continuing to sacrifice all their 
time and energy to the companies, the men increasingly lost their ability to bond with their 
families, growing more and more detached from them. Simultaneously, social problems, such 
as karoshi, sābisu zangyō and the rapid decline of the birthrate, came into view. The 
government continuously implemented new plans to address these issues, often to no avail. So 
far, the initiations have in some instances been helpful, but have not solved any issues still 
apparent in society today at the root, proving the government to have little use in maintaining 
the ideal it worked so hard to create. The labour market today is undergoing great changes, 
and a variety of new masculinity models and sexualities are emerging. Salaryman masculinity 
has evolved to become the established and acknowledged hegemonic masculinity ideal, by 
representing the ideal of the breadwinner for the family. 
In chapter 5, ―Masculinity and work‖, in an attempt to dissect the concept of the hegemonic 
breadwinner ideal, so it could be used later as a research tool during my interviews, I 
discussed masculinity identity in regards to work. I then found that while some of my 
participants were inclined towards supporting the hegemonic breadwinner ideal, often the 
same men also understood that it is only rational for women to work alongside them, even if 
there are many institutional constraints coming from their companies and state policies. So 
why submit to the hegemonic ideal at all, when rationally they knew otherwise? This was 
discussed as a threat to their identity, where the men felt that they had to justify their choices 
to maintain their masculinity. 
I agreed with Taga‘s argument about the hegemonic salaryman masculinity ideal declining in 
legitimacy, where he based his argument on the notion that salaryman masculinity has been 
emanating from the breadwinner ideal but is falling apart due to economic challenges, among 
other things. I have found during writing this thesis, that the breadwinner ideal is indeed 
crumbling, I think it is possible to argue that the hegemonic ideal is simply changing form. 
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This was followed by a section on how institutions are considerably responsible for a lack of 
gender inequality in Japan on a gender level, but an argument that it remains with the 
individual to institute change from the ground up, something which individuals in Japan are 
reluctant to do. From a supply and demand perspective, the suppliers (in this case of welfare) 
will only supply what the ―consumers‖ demand and if the people are ―consumers‖ of social 
differentiations, the suppliers will only provide what is required. If the people do not actively 
require social change, institutions with power to change society might not feel the need to 
provide. I found that the majority of my interviewees agreed with me on this point, feeling 
that although they didn‘t personally believe in keeping women at home, they didn‘t know 
how to change the system, or felt powerless to even try as it‘s so universally acknowledged to 
be the norm in Japan. 
This tied into my next point, as in Japan, instituting social change is more complicated than 
the supply and demand dichotomy model. Historically, it was not the people who initiated a 
demand for gender equality, but the pressure from outside in shape of the chase for 
industrialisation and modernity, not to mention the UN during their International Decade for 
Women. Seeing it from this perspective, it is possible to deduce this as at least one reason for 
why there is uncertainty and imbalance amongst my interviewees and potentially many others 
as well. The societal changes imposed on them through recent history have not come 
gradually as a result of natural development. Even if something is rationally understood, it has 
been learned that it must come from the government. That is not to say that factors such as the 
declining birthrate and increasingly instable economy are not highly significant to 
discouraging change as well. Rather, it is a combination of all of those aspects that create 
discrepancy in masculinity identities in Japan. 
Chapter 6, ―Masculinity and family‖, was concerned with masculinity identities as expressed 
through attitudes towards family life, to see how the hegemony could be understood from this 
angle. I discussed the views of the interviewees who were influenced by traditional ideologies 
of masculinity and who had little faith in the welfare systems in their companies. I viewed it 
in light of the institutions not providing sufficient welfare, or not providing it convincingly 
enough so that people will trust to use it, making paternity leave nightmarishly difficult to 
attain and maternity leave similarly unfair on the recipient. I considered it in the way that 
individuals perpetuate the constructed gender stereotypes by simply accepting what is offered 
to them from a higher authority (much like the government‘s offer) and using it as intended, 
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instead of critically challenging it when they find themselves feeling unhappy or in 
unfavourable situations. 
To analyse this in a family context, I drew upon the idea that mothers reinforce the hegemonic 
breadwinner ideal in the fathers‘ absence, by using them as a disciplinary tool, thereby 
influencing their children‘s ideas about the father being a strong, absent, breadwinning figure. 
I also used the concept of gender boundaries, concluding that arguably men and women both 
do not sufficiently invite each other into the private sphere of the home, and the public sphere 
of the workplace. While they do visit each other and ―try on‖ each others‘ roles, my research 
showed that the inherent ideal must still be acted out by the original gender. Furthermore, the 
hegemonic salaryman masculinity ideal is still being employed by companies and institutions 
as normative, where women are still expected to work in the same way as men do despite 
maternity needs, instead of being offered a greater range of employment practices. This 
argument demonstrates again why little change is happening, despite the apparent desire for 
it. 
Ultimately, there is not enough motivation for men to take part in child rearing, because 
women only ―let them‖ do the easier tasks. This also often contributes to the men gaining an 
uninformed idea about parenting, with some of my interviewees telling me that it would be 
sufficient fulfilment of the father role to merely take part in the more fun tasks while 
providing funds to the family to raise a child. This can sometimes have repercussions such as 
men alienating themselves from their families completely, by taking refuge in hostess clubs 
and the like, further establishing themselves as truly outside the private sphere. 
Interestingly, during my interviews, I found that several of my participants showed attitudes 
towards gender relations in both work and family that could be said to be contributing to a 
transformation of masculine identities, when comparing it to even the youngest of Hidaka‘s 
participants. The opinions inclined towards gender equality ranged from being accepting, but 
not actively engaged in the cause (Shinji) to an active attempt to change the established rules 
(Shūji, who went through his local labour union to argue for fairness at work for both 
genders). Both Shinji and Seiichi told me that their future wives would be their partners and 
best friends, rather than wives by occupation. When it came to paternity leave, Yoshio, 
Seiichi and Shūji all stated that men too should take time off when a child is born into the 
family, not only the women, a groundbreaking decision given the history of paternity leave in 
Japan. Shigeo and Tōru, as well as Yoshio who had a range of opinions on the subject, 
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showed a slightly less radical view, believing it to be unnecessary for a man to take off a long 
time and that working out a work-life balance would be a more realistic goal. But Yoshio for 
instance did not shun the possibility that his future wife might want to work full-time and 
wish him to stay home with the child, concluding that he will consider this as a valid option, 
should it come up when the time comes. This was an astonishing result, given how time and 
time again it seemed established that this was an almost unthinkable task for a man, rendering 
them highly unmasculine – yet Yoshio was open-minded enough to consider it, demonstrating 
a rather strong current of change in attitude, if not in practice. 
In chapter 7, ―Masculinity and life purpose‖, I examined men‘s individual life purpose, be it 
work, family or the self, and the ways in which it could be connected to transformations in 
masculinity identity. First, I presented the more traditional views in academia of ikigai being 
work, mostly built on the mutual economic dependency between companies and their 
employees, moreso than ideological loyalty. 
When initially examining Mathews‘ results of what his respondents considered their ikigai, I 
was surprised in finding that the development pointed towards men considering their ikigai to 
have progressed to self-fulfilment, skipping over family altogether. In contrast, for example, 
several of Hidaka‘s informants considered their ikigai to be family and I hypothesised that 
this would be the case for my informants as well. However, it turned out that practically all of 
my informants, with the exception of Yoshio, who‘s ikigai was arguably family, and Keitarō 
and Shūji, who‘s ikigai was arguably work, lived for self-fulfilment in some form or another. 
This variety in ikigai demonstrated that there is an evident transformation in masculine 
identities, but in a slightly different direction than I initially thought. 
Returning finally to the critique of hegemonic masculinity as discussed in chapter 3, ―Theory‖ 
there are simply too many layers in masculinity that overlap, intersect and play against each 
other, which makes it difficult to determine what hegemonic masculinity actually is 
nowadays. In Japan, what makes a man a man? In the end, few of my participants (and 
possibly few of Mathews‘ and Hidaka‘s as well) can be said to represent the ―real 
salaryman‖, neither in opinion nor demeanour, and few of them can in fact be said to 
maintain the constructed ideology behind it either. Therefore, it must also be safe to say that 
transformations in masculinity identities are not only possible, but highly realistic – 
salarymen have changed, and so too have the ideals. In time, surely reality will change as 
well. 
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So, is the shift in masculine identity of young salarymen moving away from the hegemonic 
ideal which affected older generations? Most definitely yes, in all instances. These forms of 
changes presented themselves as either quite radical as it was in the context of work, or in 
unexpected form, as in the context of a willingness to participate as a stay-at-home father, but 
when considered as ikigai as a life purpose, it shows a significant departure. When examining 
this question in the contexts of work, of family and of life purpose, it was impossible to 
ignore the undercurrent of change, the desire for development, and a shift in identity. 
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Attachments 
Question guide: 
WORK – 仕事 
- Which line of work do you do? (Not which company, but what type of job/trade) How 
long have you worked there?  
- 今、どのような業界で仕事していますか？ 
そこで働いてからどのくらい経ちますか？ 
- Before you started, what did you expect from the job? How did you expect your time 
management to be?  
- 働き始める前に、その会社に入ってからの生活をどのように想像していたか
教えてください。 
例えば、自分の時間や、友達、家族、恋人との時間など、どのように想像し
ましたか？ 
- What other options do you think you had?  
- 就職活動している時に、今の仕事以外に、他にどのような選択肢がありまし
たか？ 
- Why did you choose this particular trade? 
- 今の仕事を選んだ理由を教えてください。 
- Can you describe a normal day at work? 
- 会社であなたが日々どのように働いているのか教えてください。 
- I know that generalists are more valued than specialists in Japanese companies. Your 
work assignments change often and you don‘t always know what to expect from your 
job. Have you been moved around during your time at this job? How did you 
experience this particular part of working in that company? Was it difficult, easy to 
adjust? 
- 日本の会社では一般的に、専門職よりも、いろいろな部署を経験する総合職
のほうが高く評価されていると聞いた事がありますが、どうですか？ 
総合職の場合、異動のたびに職務内容が変わる可能性があるので、先が読め
ないと思いますが、、、あなたは、今まで職務内容の異なる部署への異動を
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経験したことはありますか？ 早く新しい職場に慣れる事はできましたか？ 
その経験を教えてください。 
- Can you tell me about the welfare system at your work? How familiar are you with the 
rules?  
- あなたの会社の福利厚生について教えてください。制度や規則についてどの
ぐらい知っていますか？  
o how many days you can take off legally 
o 有給休暇について 
o how much vacation you are entitled 
o 夏期、年末などの長期休暇の制度について 
o paternity leave 
o 男性の出産、育児休暇について 
o overtime work [how many hours are legal, how much do you get paid, if at all] 
o 残業手当について 
o company housing, pension, promotion, tax system 
o その他、給与や昇格についての制度、年金制度、社員用の福利厚生施
設など 
- Did you utilize these rules?  
- それらの福利厚生を使う事がありますか？ どの制度ですか？ 
o If yes, have there ever been any social problems regarding? 
o 使った事がある場合、何か問題はありましたか？ 
職場で特に気をつけなければいけないことはありましたか？ 
o If not, why not? 
o 使った事がない場合、その理由を教えてください 
- In which situation is it befitting to utilize the welfare system in a corporation like 
yours? 
- もしすべての福利制度を使用することに後ろめたさがある場合、あなたの会
社ではどこまで許容されると思いますか？ 
- Some overtime work is not paid. What is the situation at your job? Can you tell me 
some situations or reasons that paying overtime work is not necessary? 
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- 日本では、残業や休憩時間に仕事をしても、その分の手当が支払われない状
況があると聞いたことがあります。あなたの会社ではどうですか？ 
すべての残業を申請しますか、もしくは、できますか？ 
サービス残業についてどう思うか教えてください。 
- What do you think is the reason why these rules exist even if no one utilizes them to 
their full extent anyway? 
- 多くの人が福利厚生制度をあまり利用しないもしくは、利用できない場合、
なぜその規則があると思いますか？ 
- Can you tell me about the environment at your work? What is good about it? What is 
bad about it? What do you think is necessary to make it better (if it is overwhelmingly 
bad)? 
- 職場環境について教えてください。どのような良いところがりますか？ 
逆に悪いところはありますか？ 
改善する為には、誰が何をする必要があると思いますか？ 
SPOUSE/ PARTNERSHIP 
- Before you started working, how did you expect to find a partner, if you don‘t have 
one? If you already had a partner, how did you expect your relationship to become? 
- 仕事を始めてからプライベートの時間が少なくなったと感じる方に質問しま
す。就職前からの彼女がいない方は、その後短いプライベートの中でどのよ
うにして彼女を見つけることを想像しあしたか？ 
就職前からの彼女がいる方は、その後の関係についてどうなると予想してい
ましたか？ 
- What is your opinion on 50/50 labour division between spouses? 
- 共働きについてどう考えますか？ 
- Are there career women at your company/division? What is your relationship to them? 
What about their style of working? 
- あなたの職場では男性と同じ職種（いわゆる総合職）で働いている女性はい
ますか？ 
彼女達がその状況でどのよう感じていると、あなたは思いますか？ 
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- How do you experience having a girlfriend/wife while you are working (if he has a 
girlfriend/wife)? 
- 彼女がいる場合、仕事しながらでの彼女との関係はどうですか？ 
- What does it mean to be a husband for you? 
- あなたにとって「夫」とはどのような意味がありますか？ 
FATHER/FAMILY 
- Did your father work hard when you were growing up? What did your mother do? 
How did you experience this situation? 
- あなたが子供の頃、あなたのお父さんも今のあなたと同じように会社員とし
て働いていましたか？ お母さんはなにをしていましたか？ 
どのような状況だったか教えてください。 
- Is there anything you would like to do differently when you get children? Was there 
something you were unhappy with that you would like to improve or was there 
something you like and were proud of that you would like to keep? (Not in a dream 
world, but realistically what is possible to accomplish.) 
- あなたが家庭を持ったときには。自分の子供の頃と同じように子供を育てま
すか？ それとも何か変えたいと思うことはありますか？ 
- What pros and cons are there in leaving your children with a kindergarten or in day-
care or babysitter/grandmother while both parents are working? What are the pros and 
cons of one parent staying home? 
- 両親が共働きの場合、子供は両親が働いている間、保育園や祖父母と過ごす
と思いますが、どう思いますか？ 
良い点よくない点などはありますか？また、片方の親が働かず子供と一緒に
いる場合の良い点よくない点はどう思いますか？ 
- How do you expect your role as a father to be?  
- あなたは、自身にどのような父親像を想像しますか？ 
GENERAL 
- Choose between two: 1) Work is the important thing – and the purpose of leisure time 
is to recharge people‘s batteries so they can do a better job 2) Leisure time is the 
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important thing – and the purpose of work is to make it possible to have the leisure 
time to enjoy life and pursue one‘s interests. 
- 仕事についての姿勢について、以下の二つのうち、あなたはどちらかといえ
ば（1）と（2）どちらだと思いますか？1）仕事は重要なことで、余暇の目的
は、仕事の合間に頭と体をリフレッシュし、また仕事の質を高めるためです
。2）余暇は重要なことで、仕事の目的は余暇のためにお金を稼ぎ、余暇を楽
しむためです。 
- How do you expect to balance work and family in the future? 
- 将来、あなたはどのようにして、仕事、家族、余暇のバランスをとろうと考
えていますか？ 
